Constantine, Babel, and Yankee Doodling: Whose Indigeneity? Whose Psychology?

Abstract

This essay addresses the issue of indigeneity in terms of local cultures. The authors do so in conversation with Kim, Yang, and Hwang's recent book, Indigenous and Cultural Psychology: Understanding People in Context. The life and work of Virgilio Enriquez is reviewed briefly as an exemplary indigenous psychologist. He illustrates the possibility of an indigenous psychology with a local, regulative grammar of cognition, affect, behavior, and relationships. The accounts of the tower of Babel and Constantine point to the irreversible damage of homogenizing culture and imposing it on other cultures. We argue that the imposition of a local, particular Western psychology on a global scale might risk a similar cost. The authors propose that current research in indigenous psychologies might take more seriously the notion that culture is not monolithic but should be understood from the point of view of the analysis of power relationships. Secondly, the authors argue that the role of language has not received sufficient attention in terms of shaping thought and increasing the incommensurability between cultures. Thirdly, it is argued that positivist epistemology has dominated the field and that more hermeneutic approaches must be considered. Fourth, the question must be asked regarding who controls indigenous research. Too often control has been exogenous rather than in the hands of local leaders. Finally, it is suggested that North Americans would do well to examine and recognize the indigeneity of their own psychology.

Critical cultural awareness: Contributions to a globalizing psychology.

“…Although this moral vision has long been criticized by feminists, critical theorists, multiculturalists, and others (e.g., Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1986; Sampson, 1977; Sue & Sue, 1977), it remains in force among mainstream psychologists. Moreover, many U.S.-trained psychologists appear to be unaware that in many societies, the pursuit of self-defined desires, wants, and needs is neither a moral imperative nor a marker of mental health (Dueck, Ting, & Cutliongco, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Indeed, for most of the world (and throughout most of history), sources of meaning and visions of the good life are not a matter of purported “inner” dictates; rather, they come from external sources (Bellah et al, 1985; Taylor, 1989, 2007; Ullmann, 1966): harmonizing with extended family, kin networks, or society; obedience to or faith in a supreme being (as in Judeo-Christian-Islamic traditions); or aligning with the natural order of the cosmos (as in Taoism, Confucianism, Platonism, and many Native American traditions).…”