Constitutional bargaining and the quality of contemporary African institutions: a test of the incremental reform hypothesis

Abstract

The incremental reform hypothesis implies that constitutions are rarely adopted whole cloth but instead emerge gradually from a series of reforms. The starting point, scope for bargaining, and number of reforms thus jointly determine the trajectory of constitutional history. We test the relevance of this theory for Africa by analysing the formation and reform of the independence constitutions negotiated and adopted during the 1950s and early 1960s. We provide historical evidence that independence occurred in a manner consistent with the incremental reform hypothesis. After independence, constitutional bargaining continued, although the alignment of interests inside and outside government initially favoured illiberal reforms. Liberal trends re-emerged a few decades later. We provide statistical evidence of incremental reform during both post-independence sub-periods. In general, the African countries that experienced the fewest constitutional moments and the narrowest domain of bargaining in the first decades of independence tend to have better contemporary institutions than states that began with less restrictive constitutional rules and experienced more constitutional moments.

Weak economic institutions in Africa: a destiny or design?

“…So, despite the wide scholarly recognition of the role of institutions, the question that still remains unanswered is why are institutions weak in Africa? Attempting to answer this question, prominent recent works divided the determinants of institutional quality into the broad categories of geographical conditions (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 1997; Gallup et al , 1998; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Lehne et al , 2014), ethnic fractionalization (La Porta et al , 1999), economic performance (North, 1981; Chong and Zanforlin, 2000; Islam and Montenegro, 2002, among others), income distribution (Alesina and Rodrik, 1993; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997), trade openness (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008 and others) colonization (Acemoglu et al , 2001, 2002) and governance factor (Acemoglu, 2006; Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2016; Congleton and Yoo, 2018).…”

Constitutional instability and foreign direct investment in Africa

“…For instance, a constitutional change could degrade the quality of an institution. Congleton and Yoo (2018) show that African countries that experienced the fewest constitutional changes in the first decades of independence tend to have better contemporary institutions than states that experienced more. Besides, Li and Abiad (2009) argue that weak institutions increase several inefficiencies, including transaction costs, that deter economic performance.…”

Introduction to the Special Issue on colonial institutions and African development

“…Roger D. Congleton and Dongwoo Yoo (2017) contribute an article entitled ‘Constitutional bargaining and the quality of contemporary African institutions: a test of the incremental reform hypothesis’. The incremental reform hypothesis implies that constitutions are rarely adopted wholesale but instead emerge gradually from a series of reforms.…”