Constitutional courts as promoters of political centralization: lessons for the European Court of Justice

Vaubel, Roland

doi:10.1007/s10657-009-9108-8

Cited by 23 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…The empirical evidence is given for cross-sectional data from 50 countries in 1989-1991. In his later study, Vaubel (2009) confirms the previous results and further expands analysis on this area of research. First, the author describes that centralization is larger in those countries where judges of the higher court enjoy independence from the other governmental branches.…”

Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 82%

Judges as Fiscal Activists: Can Constitutional Review Shape Public Finance?

Kantorowicz

2014

Danube

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The judicialization of politics, or alternatively, politization of the judiciary has been much discussed over the last twenty years. Despite this, the way judges influence fiscal policy outcomes remains, to a large extent, unexplored. This paper attempts, at least partially, to fill this research gap. A judicial (constitutional) review constitutes the central element of the current analysis since it is considered as a key institutional device through which Constitutional (Supreme) Courts intervene in politics, including public finance. Specifically, this paper seeks to investigate empirically whether there is any systematic pattern according to which judges executing judicial review shape fiscal outcomes. The conceptual framework is based on the strategic interaction model and the assumption that the Constitutional Courts reflect public opinion (i.e. the Court as a majoritarian institution). Some preliminary results for a panel of 24 EU countries in the period 1995-2005 suggest that a strong judicial review correlates with a smaller size of government, measured as government income to GDP.

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Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 82%

Judges as Fiscal Activists: Can Constitutional Review Shape Public Finance?

Kantorowicz

2014

Danube

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“…Constitutional courts, central banks, and other administrations and bureaus are as many agents supposed to serve the interests and objectives of their principals, the citizens. In practice, however, they often follow quite autonomous agendas (Josselin and Marciano 2000;Vaubel 2009). The last three chapters of the book elaborate on that.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constitutional Mythologies

2011

Studies in Public Choice

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“…Most analyses focus on the impact of the blurring of boundaries between political and judicial dynamics on democratic development. Analysts indicate that the more prominent role of the judiciary influences political dynamics in different ways: it affects the decision of voters to select political leaders (Fox and Stephenson, 2011); it impacts legislative decisions in a competitive political environment (Rogers, 2001); it has the potential to work as an insurance mechanism for policy continuity in situations of adverse electoral outcomes (Tridimas, 2010); and it fosters political centralization (Vaubel, 2009). Disputes related to the Legislative branch have been brought before constitutional courts, changing the way in which conflicts have been commonly resolved.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The judicialization of territorial politics in Brazil, Colombia and Spain

Vale

2013

Bras. Political Sci. Rev.

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This article explains how judicial review influences intergovernmental political dynamics in Brazil, Colombia and Spain. The argument is developed in light of two questions: how supreme courts have established themselves as pivotal institutions for settling vertical intergovernmental disputes, and how national and subnational politicians use judicial review in order to enhance their own interests. A comparison between the judicial review processes in federal Brazil, quasi-federal Spain, and unitary Colombia provides an answer to these questions. Accounting for the differences in the territorial organization and systems of government among these countries, the article assesses the patterns of judicial review originating from the subnational level. Findings suggest that courts affect the interaction between national and subnational politicians in the three country-cases, but through different patterns of judicialization of territorial politics.

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Constitutional courts as promoters of political centralization: lessons for the European Court of Justice

Abstract: Constitutional courts, International courts, European integration, H 77, K 33, P 48,

Cited by 23 publications

References 27 publications

Judges as Fiscal Activists: Can Constitutional Review Shape Public Finance?

Judges as Fiscal Activists: Can Constitutional Review Shape Public Finance?

Constitutional Mythologies

The judicialization of territorial politics in Brazil, Colombia and Spain

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