‘Constitutional Dialogue’: An Overview

Meuwese, Anne; Snel, Marnix

doi:10.18352/ulr.231

Cited by 23 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…If Meuwese and Snel refer to the actual practice, 101 i.e. the procedural and formal aspects of the dialogue, several elements were highlighted throughout this contribution that would improve the constitutional dialogue: a thorough assessment of the rulings of the Court in parliamentary proceedings, an increase of the usage of the rulings by the Court as a means of political control and, above all, the establishment of a wellfunctioning parliamentary committee responsible for monitoring the case law of the Constitutional Court.…”

Section: Improving the Practice Of Interpreting Reviewing Writing Omentioning

confidence: 99%

Constitutional Dialogue in the Case of Legislative Omissions: Who Fills the Legislative Gap?

Verstraelen¹

2018

ULR

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Section: Improving the Practice Of Interpreting Reviewing Writing Omentioning

confidence: 99%

Constitutional Dialogue in the Case of Legislative Omissions: Who Fills the Legislative Gap?

Verstraelen¹

2018

ULR

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“…191 According to Meuwese and Snel, the value of such dialogue is that the constitutional actors do not need to acknowledge that they are engaged in a dialogue. 192 They suggest that the instances of dialogue may be called 'constitutional' 'because of their aspiration to contribute to, implement or even shape the basic norms that govern the Figure 2 actions of public entities and their exercise of coercive power in particular'. 193 This is not to presuppose that the model need be a codified 'dialogical mechanisms' as is present in some constitutions (such as Article 33 of the Canadian Charter).…”

Section: Responsiveness To the Behaviour Attitude And Culture Of The Communities Which Regulation Must Servementioning

confidence: 99%

Learning from the laws of the sea, Foucault and regulatory theory: proposing a ‘regulatory harbour’ model for the regulation of social media that serves rather than rules the waves

Scaife¹

2018

NILQ

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This paper will make a modest case of the regulation of social media. Improved rule-making comes when the means of securing compliance is shaped having regard to the particular problem at hand, rather than by clinging to the notion that rules shape the world. Through a consideration of the regulation of the sea, this paper has served to illustrate that regulation is possible. In the context of social media, where individuals work constantly on their self-identity and perform self-development though expressive activities in public, the use of social media sites can represent what Foucault described as techniques of the self. This paper proposes a theoretical and methodological approach to thinking about the regulation of social media as conceptualised in an iterative and dynamic model that is characterised by the technologisation of human interaction and increasingly transparent ways of living in an age of ‘technologies of the self ’. This approach will facilitate a more critical, responsive and iterative awareness of the regulation of expressive content in a way that can grow with the technological state of the art, alive to cultural sensitivities and the use of the tools as a vessel for self-development.

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“…Meuwese e Snel chegam a declarar que o conceito de diálogo constitucional envolve muitas vezes concepções mutualmente excludentes e o termo é tão disputado quanto o conceito de democracia (MEUWESE;SNEL, 2013, p. 124). Entretanto, a despeito das concepções divergentes do conceito, a teoria do diálogo constitucional tem um leitmotiv claro: a ideia de que ramos diferentes do Estado (executivo, legislativo e judiciário) e a sociedade interagem para moldar no tempo a interpretação constitucional dominante.…”

Section: Lista De Abreviaturas E Siglasunclassified

Diálogo constitucional entre o STF e o Congresso Nacional no controle de constitucionalidade por omissão na vigência da Constituição Federal de 1988

Castro¹

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This paper aims to analyze the functioning of the theory of constitutional dialogue, in the context of the system of control of unconstitutionality by omission created in the Federal Constitution of 1988. To achieve this objective, the research is based on a review of the literature on the theme of constitutionalism and democracy, especially on the legitimacy of judicial review. Thus, the research begins with a historical perspective, with the review of the work of the National Constituent Assembly of 1987-1988. A relevant theoretical issue, the theme of the directive constitution, is dealt with in view of the relationship between constitutional directionalism, the legislator's attachment and unconstitutional omission. The default constitutionality control model provided for in the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 is problematizing the traditional Kelsenian view of Constitutional Courts as negative legislators. In this sense, the procedural instruments to combat legislative omission created by the constituent, especially the injunction, caused widespread doctrinal and jurisprudential controversy by enabling the realization of constitutionally dependent constitutional rights, which would make the courts positive legislators. The possibility of judicial review to generate a problem of democratic legitimacy is a subject debated from the monological and dialogical theory. The monological ones start from the premise that there is a final decision regarding constitutional interpretation. The controversy on this topic is to define which state body would be responsible for the 'final word' on the interpretation of constitutional norms: the political bodies or the courts. The perspective theory of constitutional dialogue has been welcomed in Brazilian doctrine as a synthesis of the controversy over whom the primacy of constitutional interpretation belongs: judges or legislators. In the present work we defend the hypothesis that the theory of constitutional dialogue is viewed in a benign way, mystifying the conflicts between powers. Regarding the applicability of dialogical techniques in the control of constitutionality by omission, the existence of a formal method of dialogue between the powers in Brazil is argued, which operates in a non-deliberative manner, contrary to what many scholars argue. The low effectiveness of the dialogue between the Supreme Court and the National Congress in the supply of legislative omissions is also discussed.

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‘Constitutional Dialogue’: An Overview

Cited by 23 publications

References 10 publications

Constitutional Dialogue in the Case of Legislative Omissions: Who Fills the Legislative Gap?

Constitutional Dialogue in the Case of Legislative Omissions: Who Fills the Legislative Gap?

Learning from the laws of the sea, Foucault and regulatory theory: proposing a ‘regulatory harbour’ model for the regulation of social media that serves rather than rules the waves

Diálogo constitucional entre o STF e o Congresso Nacional no controle de constitucionalidade por omissão na vigência da Constituição Federal de 1988

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