Constitutional metaphors: Facebook’s “supreme court” and the legitimation of platform governance

Abstract

Who governs—and who should govern—online communication? Social media companies, international organizations, users, or the state? And by what means? A range of rhetorical devices have been used to simplify the complexities associated with the governance of online platforms. This includes “constitutional metaphors”: metaphorical allusions to traditional political concepts such as statehood, democracy, and constitutionalism. Here, we empirically trace the ascent of a powerful constitutional metaphor currently employed in the news media discourse on platform governance: characterizations of Facebook’s Oversight Board (OB) as a “supreme court.” We investigate the metaphor’s descriptive suitability and question its normative and political ramifications. We argue that uncritical characterizations of the OB as Facebook’s “supreme court” obscure its true scope and purpose. In addition, we argue that appropriating the socio-cultural symbolism and hence political legitimacy of a supreme court and mapping it onto a different type of actor poses a threat to responsible platform governance.

Public and private power in social media governance: multistakeholderism, the rule of law and democratic accountability

“…Ultimately, (self-)regulation focused on corporate decision-making procedures -whether emphasising stakeholder input or rule of law norms -diverts attention from the inherently undemocratic nature of having 'a core global communication and information infrastructure…in the hands of a single profit-driven entity' (Pickard, 2022a, p17). This may be particularly true of the rule of law response, since the idealistic language of lawfulness and constitutional values is powerfully legitimising (Baars, 2019;Viljoen, 2021;Cowls et al, 2022). Discussing corporate accountability and regulation using terminology normally used for elected governments may misleadingly associate corporate platforms with democratic legitimacy and public-interest objectives (Griffin, 2021;Cowls et al, 2022), not only for the public but also in expert debates.…”

Public and Private Power in Social Media Governance: Multistakeholderism, the Rule of Law and Democratic Accountability

“…Consequently, both may reinforce the image of platforms as benevolent stewards of the public interest, rather than companies pursuing private gain. Constitutional language which analogises platforms to elected governments can be powerfully legitimising (Cowls et al, 2022). Similarly, multistakeholderist responses which emphasise platforms' responsibility to listen to civil society often effectively claim that platforms should -and, if pushed, will -do the right thing, and that with sufficient input from civil society they can fairly represent and serve their 'communities'.…”

“…Ultimately, (self-)regulation focused on corporate decision-making procedures -whether emphasising stakeholder input or rule of law norms -diverts attention from the inherently undemocratic nature of having 'a core global communication and information infrastructure…in the hands of a single profit-driven entity' (Pickard, 2022a, p17). This may be particularly true of the rule of law response, since the idealistic language of lawfulness and constitutional values is powerfully legitimising (Baars, 2019;Viljoen, 2021;Cowls et al, 2022). Discussing corporate accountability and regulation using terminology normally used for elected governments may misleadingly associate corporate platforms with democratic legitimacy and public-interest objectives (Griffin, 2021;Cowls et al, 2022), not only for the public but also in expert debates.…”

“…This may be particularly true of the rule of law response, since the idealistic language of lawfulness and constitutional values is powerfully legitimising (Baars, 2019;Viljoen, 2021;Cowls et al, 2022). Discussing corporate accountability and regulation using terminology normally used for elected governments may misleadingly associate corporate platforms with democratic legitimacy and public-interest objectives (Griffin, 2021;Cowls et al, 2022), not only for the public but also in expert debates. Suzor (2018, p4) at one point suggests that 'the project of digital constitutionalism [is] to rethink how the exercise of power ought to be limited (made legitimate) in the digital age.'…”

Who polarizes Twitter? Ideological polarization, partisan groups and strategic networked campaigning on Twitter during the 2017 and 2021 German Federal elections 'Bundestagswahlen'

“…With the growing adoption of social media platforms and the Internet, web-based or digital political campaigning has spread globally (Gibson et al 2014 ; Dimitrova and Matthes 2018 ). Due to the wide use of social media in politics and the related power of platforms as information gatekeepers, social platform architecture and governance become crucial factors for the quality and legitimacy of democracy (Gillespie 2018 ; Cowls et al 2022 ; Stockmann 2022 ). This increased importance of digital technologies and data analysis in campaign operations and organization is reflected in the transition of political communication from mass media-based to a more direct, interactive, and networked type of communication with the electorate, targeting of campaign messages, and an increasingly international dimension of political campaigns with interferences by foreign actors.…”