Constitutional Review of Treaties: Lessons for Comparative Constitutional Design and Practice

Mendez, Mario

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3756144

Cited by 3 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…The original name of Prespa Agreement is "Final Agreement for the Settlement of the Differences as Described in the United Nation Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the Termination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership Between the Parties". 17 Austria, France, Serbia, etc.…”

Section: The Position Of the Macedonian Constitutional System In The ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Macedonian Constitutional court and ratified international agreements - can the concluded international agreement be a subject of constitutional review?

Karakamisheva-Jovanovska

Saveski

2022

Zb. rad. Prav. fak. Splitu (Online)

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In every domestic law that is part of the continental legal tradition, the Constitutional court has the central role of keeping the normative balances between the national and international legal order. The formulation “internal, national legal order” involves all pronounced acts, which means the Constitution, statutes, by-laws, and ratified international agreements. Every provision of the national law must be in normative harmony with the Constitution – as a domestic regulation with the highest legal power. Hence, with the act of ratification, the international agreements can be subject to the constitutionality review - besides the statutes and the by-laws. The constitutional makers can decide the constitutionality review of the international agreements to be prescribed by constitutional norms. If the constitutional makers omitted to regulate specialized authorization, the Constitutional court, through its own practice, can create a model for reviewing the constitutionality of the international agreements. Having in mind that the Macedonian constitutional system has not provide the constitutionality control of the international agreements, the Macedonian Constitutional court has a fully independent role in defining the method for implementing the principle constitutionality over the international agreements – a specialized model for “interpretation” (complement) of the constitutional law. More precisely, the Macedonian Constitutional court has already accepted this approach for constitutional law interpretation.

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Section: The Position Of the Macedonian Constitutional System In The ...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Macedonian Constitutional court and ratified international agreements - can the concluded international agreement be a subject of constitutional review?

Karakamisheva-Jovanovska

Saveski

2022

Zb. rad. Prav. fak. Splitu (Online)

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“…Algunos modelos comparados estipulan mecanismos de participación popular directa para aprobación de tratados sobre cierto tipo de materias 124 . El ejemplo más llamativo es el de la Constitución de Suiza, que contempla diferentes tipos de referéndums respecto de distintos tipos de tratados 125 .…”

Section: La Participación Directa De La Ciudadaníaunclassified

“…De acuerdo con la Constitución vigente, el Presidente de la República es el único órgano facultado para ejercer esta atribución, dado que el Congreso Nacional solo debe emitir un pronunciamiento que no es vinculante 138 . Consideramos que el ejercicio de esta relevante facultad requiere un mayor control por parte del Congreso, el cual debería aprobar la denuncia antes de que sea formulada por el Presidente, tal como se estipula en algunas Constituciones comparadas 139 . Esto permitiría que las distintas fuerzas políticas puedan llegar a un consenso, que eventualmente podría ser contrario a la decisión del Presidente.…”

Section: La Denunciaunclassified

“…El control de constitucionalidad ex post de los tratados ha sido por tratarse de un control concreto que permitiría identificar inconstitucionalidades en la aplicación práctica del instrumento internacional en un caso determinado, siendo este un problema que el control ex ante no tendría la capacidad de detectar, al ser un control abstracto 157 .…”

Section: Control Represivounclassified

“…El control represivo de los tratados también ha sido defendido con argumentos basados en el respeto de la democracia y los derechos humanos, argumentándose que el proceso de formación de los tratados en sede internacional no cumpliría con las exigencias del juego democrático que sí tendrían aplicación en el proceso de formación de la ley a nivel nacional 158 . Por otro lado, la tutela de los derechos fundamentales, especialmente, aquellos que han sido constitucionalizados, también justificaría el ejercicio de un control ex post de aquellos tratados que podrían entran en tensión con tales derechos 159 .…”

Section: Control Represivounclassified

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Constitutional Review of Treaties: Lessons for Comparative Constitutional Design and Practice

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Macedonian Constitutional court and ratified international agreements - can the concluded international agreement be a subject of constitutional review?

Macedonian Constitutional court and ratified international agreements - can the concluded international agreement be a subject of constitutional review?

La aplicación del Derecho internacional de los derechos humanos en Chile: diagnósticos y propuestas para una Nueva Constitución transformadora

Standing in Cost‐Benefit Analysis: Where, Who, What (Counts)?

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