“…The legal explanation why this competence creep remains possible, despite the various iterations in the Lisbon Treaty of the conferral principle, harmonization prohibitions, national autonomy ‘angst clauses’ (von Bogdandy and Bast, ) and competence reservations, is because these limits generally apply only to direct legislative action by the EU and not to indirect action (on other legal bases), non‐legislative action (such as policy coordination) or action outside the EU framework altogether (such as the European Stability Mechanism Treaty or the Bologna Process). The CJEU has indeed persistently refused to acknowledge any ‘nucleus of national sovereignty’ that can be invoked as such against the EU (Lenaerts, ). Thus, for instance, even where the treaties state that the EU shall ‘fully [respect] the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems’ (Article 165(1) TFEU), that the ‘Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership’ (Article 345 TFEU), that in areas of complementary EU competence such as culture and health ‘legally binding acts of the Union adopted on the basis of the provisions of the Treaties relating to these areas shall not entail harmonisation of Member States’ laws or regulations’ (Article 2(5) TFEU) or that ‘national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State’ (Article 4(2) TFEU), this does not preclude the EU from liberalizing economic sectors, from pushing member states to introduce competitive mechanisms for higher education funding, from adopting legislation banning tobacco advertisements, or from prohibiting a member state from expelling a foreign criminal.…”