Constraining to deter

Abstract

Governments use a variety of tools to discourage, impede, or limit the ability of foreign adversaries to purse their ambitions. Some of these measures seek to constrain an opponent's capacity, while others seek to deter an opponent to take (or not) a particular action. We develop a theory to study how constraining and coercive threats interact strategically. Building on canonical models of deterrence, we first identify how coercive measures, in isolation, curb an aggressor's transgressions. We then identify when constraining measures and the threat of coercion (deterrence) are substitutes and when they are complements. In some cases, constraining measures make deterrence effective when it would otherwise fail (constraining to deter). Our results offer insights about measuring the effectiveness of various diplomatic tools. We highlight a series of novel empirical challenges stemming from the interaction of selection effects and ecological features of a sample of country dyads, and discuss potential solutions.