Constraints on the growth of private policing: A comparative international analysis

Abstract

While much has been written on private security expansion in a few English-speaking industrialized democracies, less is known about why the industry does not develop uniformly around the world. We propose some hypotheses about constraints on private security growth in other settings, based on three comparative case studies in authoritarian states (Russia and Georgia), developing countries (Guyana and Trinidad) and non-‘Anglosphere’ industrialized democracies (continental Europe). In authoritarian states, private policing is more politically sensitive than in democratic states, sometimes resulting in more draconian restrictions on it. In developing societies, despite widespread fear of crime, potential consumers sometimes favour in-house measures over private security firms and electronic devices. In developed democracies, variation in private security growth reflects regulatory, institutional and ideological differences between the Anglosphere and continental Europe. We conclude that constraints on the private security industry’s growth potential are more significant than many scholars have acknowledged.

How gun control policies evolve: Gun culture, ‘gunscapes’ and political contingency in post-Soviet Georgia

“…The government thus settled on moderate regulation with stringent monitoring. The exception, Saakashvili's limitations on armed private security companies, may reflect his anti-organized crime campaign, his attempt to monopolize private security for the police, or both; see Lehmbruch and Sanikidze (2014) and Singh and Light (2017).…”

Corporatizing security through champions, condos and credentials

“…Yet, there is also conceptual conflation. Singh and Light (2017) suggest the group dominance of multinational security firms that provide private security comprises “corporatization” or “McDonaldization” (p. 9) that is market-based (p. 12). But this blurs conceptual lines by assuming corporatization is a matter of private ownership and selling of security.…”

Private security and national security: The case of Estonia

“…Here we analyse how the country's geopolitical environment influences domestic policing institutions, particularly private policing. In Singh and Light (2019), noting that most studies of private security in Anglosphere countries focus on internal political influences on the industry, we suggested that major internal and external threats to regime survival should lead to a greater state role in shaping private security. While this need not mean more restrictions on private security companies, it presumably would mean greater state involvement in their development and regulation, including in Estonia.…”

“…They included current and former advisors in the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for public order, internal security, border control, and civil society co-ordination; police officers; the former head of security for the Estonian National Railway; the Chair of the Firearms Licensing Commission; the President of the private security industry's national federation; and media and civil defence actors. Interviews were semi-structured and explored themes identified by our previous study (Singh and Light, 2019), the extant literature on Estonia policing, and the interviewees themselves. Although the narrative history of the Estonian security industry comes from documentary sources and secondary literature, our interviews in Tallinn fleshed out the motivations and assumptions of actors involved in shaping the industry, particularly by bringing out the connections between national security and private security.…”