Constructed peer groups and path dependence in international organizations: The case of the international climate change negotiations

Castro, Paula; Hörnlein, Lena; Michaelowa, Katharina

doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.01.007

Cited by 29 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…First, the Annex division is an important determinant of self-interest in the negotiations, being in itself a differentiation scheme with Annex I status linked to obligation and non-Annex I status to privileges (Castro et al, 2014). Hence, non-Annex I countries would benefit from the scheme's continuation and Annex I countries from its removal.…”

Section: Discussion Of Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Castro et al (2014) find that the Annex division strongly influences negotiation behaviour, as non-Annex I countries have an incentive to jointly lobby for the continuation of status quo.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…This finding indicates that the Annex division has profoundly shaped which fairness conceptions different parties support. An important explanation for this is that Annex I is in the Convention linked to obligations, while non-Annex I is linked to privileges (Castro et al, 2014), which means that non-Annex I countries benefit from the scheme's continuation and Annex I countries from its removal. Therefore, the significance of the Annex variable is compatible with the assumption that parties invoke fairness principles with the goal of advancing their own interests.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fairness in the climate negotiations: what explains variation in parties’ expressed conceptions?

Tørstad

Sælen

2017

Climate Policy

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Section: Discussion Of Regression Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Castro et al (2014) find that the Annex division strongly influences negotiation behaviour, as non-Annex I countries have an incentive to jointly lobby for the continuation of status quo.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Fairness in the climate negotiations: what explains variation in parties’ expressed conceptions?

Tørstad

Sælen

2017

Climate Policy

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“…Annex I) and \developing" (non-Annex I) by the UNFCCC. 4 This categorization, and the related principle of Common But Di®erentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) was formally agreed to in the context of negotiations around the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (i.e. the Earth Summit), and included in the UNFCC to formally recognize the historical di®erences in the contributions of developed and developing states to global environmental problems, as well as their di®erent capacities to respond.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Support for International Climate Action Conditional on Perceptions of Reciprocity? Evidence From Survey Experiments in Canada, the Us, Norway, and Sweden

Tvinnereim

Lachapelle

Borick

2016

COSMOS

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The challenges of collective action are presented by leaders in many industrialized countries as a major obstacle to e®ective action on climate change. Notably, the argument goes, a fair international solution must appropriately constrain large greenhouse gas emitters like China. This paper asks whether citizen support for multilateral climate policies also depends on whether other countries are seen to reciprocate. We analyze results from population-based survey experiments in the US, Canada, Norway, and Sweden, asking subjects whether they think their country should commit internationally to emission reductions. Randomly assigned sub-samples were presented with statements suggesting that China may or may not choose to cooperate, or alternatively making no mention of China. We¯nd that reciprocity is important to respondents in the smaller Scandinavian countries but not in North America. These¯ndings suggest that country size is more important than national traditions of multilateral cooperation in predicting support for unilateral climate action.

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“…A third hurdle is embedded in internal group and coalition dynamics that sometimes generate further polarization (Castro et al 2014, Sunstein 2002, Rothstein 1984. Morgenthau (1985, p. 579) overstated the case when he wrote, "Not only is a publicly conducted diplomacy unable to reach agreement or even to negotiate for the purpose of reaching agreement, but each public meeting leaves international relations in a worse state than before."…”

Section: Regime Outputs: Regulations and Incentive Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate Change and International Relations (After Kyoto)

Underdal

2017

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

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This review “diagnoses” climate change as an international governance challenge and explores the political feasibility of alternative “cures.” Human activities’ growing effect on Earth's climate system is extremely challenging, characterized by, inter alia, very long time lags between mitigation measures (∼costs) and environmental effects (∼benefits) and by stark asymmetries between “guilt” in causing the problem and vulnerability to climate change. Two main cures have been suggested. Some analysts argue that because climate change is a global process, adequate solutions must likewise be global. Others shift attention from the challenge's format to the sources of human motivation, arguing that a decentralized (bottom-up) approach will more directly engage a wider spectrum of motivations and actors. These cures are neither mutually exclusive nor easily combined. IR research contributes more to the former cure than to the latter but can play a constructive role in linking them.

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Constructed peer groups and path dependence in international organizations: The case of the international climate change negotiations

Cited by 29 publications

References 49 publications

Fairness in the climate negotiations: what explains variation in parties’ expressed conceptions?

Fairness in the climate negotiations: what explains variation in parties’ expressed conceptions?

Is Support for International Climate Action Conditional on Perceptions of Reciprocity? Evidence From Survey Experiments in Canada, the Us, Norway, and Sweden

Climate Change and International Relations (After Kyoto)

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