Constructing persons: On the personal–subpersonal distinction

Westfall, Mason

doi:10.1080/09515089.2022.2096431

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…20 Some explanations are needed. First, although the personal/subpersonal distinction is assumed in many philosophical discussions, it is challenging to precisely define what is meant by "personal/subpersonal-level" (Drayson, 2012(Drayson, , 2014Westfall, 2022). Such a distinction initially pertains to psychological explanations (Dennett, 1969).…”

Section: An Alternative Two-factor Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

The justificatory power of memory experience

Teng

2024

PhiMiSci

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Psychological research has discovered that episodic memories are constructive in nature. This paper examines how, despite being constructive, episodic memories can provide us with justification for beliefs about the past. In current literature, two major approaches to memorial justification are internalist foundationalism and reliabilism. I first demonstrate that an influential version of internalist foundationalism, dogmatism, encounters problems when we compare certain types of memory construction with cognitive penetration in perception. On the other hand, various versions of reliabilism all face skeptical challenges. I propose an alternative, two-factor theory that recognizes an epistemic distinction typically overlooked by dogmatism and reliabilism. Although our account leaves certain aspects unspecified, it is an important step forward.

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Section: An Alternative Two-factor Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

The justificatory power of memory experience

Teng

2024

PhiMiSci

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Unconscious Perception, Action, and the Problem of Attribution

Zięba

2024

Acta Anal

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According to Phillips, (1) genuine perception is attributable to the individual (i.e. it is a personal state/event, as opposed to sub-personal states/events in the individual’s brain); (2) since unconscious perceptual representations are ill-suited to guide action, there is no good reason to attribute them to the individual; (3) not being attributable to the individual, they do not instantiate genuine perception, thereby failing to support the hypothesis that genuine perception can occur unconsciously. I argue that this reasoning is flawed and cannot be easily fixed. Phillips contends that unconscious perceptual representations do not guide action because they fail to meet certain conditions that are sufficient for action guidance. But those conditions may not be necessary for action guidance. Consequently, unconscious perceptual representations may guide action even if they do not meet Phillips’ conditions. Furthermore, due to his commitment to the distinction between personal and sub-personal states/events, Phillips is not in a position to argue that his conditions are necessary for action guidance. For the distinction applies to action as well as to perception, and when genuine action is identified by personal-level criteria, Phillips’ conditions turn out unnecessary for action guidance.

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Are mental dysfunctions autonomous from brain dysfunctions? A perspective from the personal/subpersonal distinction

Jurjako

2024

Discov Ment Health

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Despite many authors in psychiatry endorsing a naturalist view of the mind, many still consider that mental dysfunctions cannot be reduced to brain dysfunctions. This paper investigates the main reasons for this view. Some arguments rely on the analogy that the mind is like software while the brain is like hardware. The analogy suggests that just as software can malfunction independently of hardware malfunctions, similarly the mind can malfunction independently of any brain malfunction. This view has been critically examined in recent literature. However, other less discussed reasons suggest that mental dysfunctions cannot be reduced to brain dysfunctions because mental dysfunctions are appropriately ascribed at the level of intentional mental states, while brain dysfunctions are solely related to abnormalities in anatomy and physiological processes. This paper questions why such a view would be upheld. The discussion is framed within the interface problem in the philosophy of cognitive science, which concerns the relationship between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation. The paper examines the view that an autonomist perspective on the personal/subpersonal distinction could justify the separation of mental dysfunctions, described in intentional terms, from brain dysfunctions, described in anatomical or physiological terms. Ultimately, the paper argues that the autonomist view cannot be upheld in psychiatry and, consequently, does not provide a principled justification for rejecting the reduction of mental dysfunctions to brain dysfunctions.

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Constructing persons: On the personal–subpersonal distinction

Abstract: This is a pre-print of a paper to be published in Philosophical Psychology. Please cite the published version when possible.

Cited by 3 publications

References 67 publications

The justificatory power of memory experience

The justificatory power of memory experience

Unconscious Perception, Action, and the Problem of Attribution

Are mental dysfunctions autonomous from brain dysfunctions? A perspective from the personal/subpersonal distinction

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