Constructing state, territory, and sovereignty in the Syrian conflict

Abstract

The article argues that sovereignty claims and counterclaims are still very much at work in international and civil conflicts involving state actors. Focusing on the case of the Syrian conflict, the article engages in methodological triangulation using Critical Discourse Analysis and international relations theories. It finds that the sovereignty-first narrative adopted by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and its external allies such as Russia, has built an ‘effective’ discourse that has been adopted in a coherent, consistent, and resonant manner, as well as a ‘credible’ discourse which combined words with actions (i.e. performatives and constatives of sovereignty). The effectiveness and credibility of the sovereignty-first narrative is also judged by the absence of effective and credible contending narratives demonstrated by the tepid application of concepts like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by the United States and its European allies. In making these comparisons, the Syrian conflict can be contextualised by relating it to the Arab Spring and geopolitical shifts in international affairs. It is within this contextualisation that the article demonstrates broader claims about the endurance of the ‘territorial state’ in the Middle East.

“Discoursing sectarianism” approach: What and how to analyse in sectarian discourses

“…This involves consideration of the characters, the scene, actions.' In certain sections of his article, Menshawy (2019) describes the linguistic forms which Assad uses as independent of the purpose or functions which these forms are designed in serve, mainly legitimating his rule and survival. In this sense, language is a ‘transparent medium' (Wetherell, 2006, p. 16) or a vehicle for getting to what is in the mind of Saudi campaigners in the case of Walsh's article, and in the mind of Assad in the case of Menshawy's article.…”

“…As Menshawy (2019) demonstrates in his article published in this special issue, Syrian President Bashar al‐Assad furthered his sectarian practices through ideologies that might be presumed antithetical to religion, such as secularism and nationalism. This analysis could expand our understanding of the phenomenon and re‐conceptualise apparently‐religious sectarianisation as ‘secular', ‘tribal', or ‘national'.…”

“…Former President Barack Obama directly attributed the Syrian crisis to ‘ancient hatreds.' Others blamed the history of colonialism for enflaming and even introducing sectarianism to the inherently integrated Middle East (Menshawy, 2019). Reliance on claims about legacies of a fixed past misses the opportunity of better understanding sectarianism within present developments.…”

Sovereignty alignment process: strategies of regime survival in Egypt, Libya and Syria

“…Some scholars, such as Leïla Vignal (2017, 812), even claimed that the Syrian state was 'invented' with the agreements concluding the First World War. The Baathist Party of Hafez al-Assad, president from 1971 to his death in 2000 (when his son Bashar, in power since, was elected), also reinforced the belief by prioritising 'the consolidation of the territorial state' (Vignal 2017, 812-14; see also Menshawy 2019). As a member of the minority Alawite sect who stood opposed to foreign occupation, and whose legitimacy and authority were questioned by the majority Sunni population, protecting territory served for three decades as his principal justification for holding power (Seale 1989, 120).…”

“…On one hand, the concept keeps taking on various meanings, allowing it to acquire a unique specificity and certain characteristics in every practice (eg Menshawy 2019). On the other hand, attempts continue to enclose the concept within monolithic encasements, standardising and generalising sovereignty itself (eg Henderson 2014).…”