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In this paper, we study the decision-making and coordination problem of a two-tier fresh food supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. Considering the influencing factors of consumers’ information preference, freshness, and misrepresentation, we construct a centralized decision-making model and a decentralized decision-making Stackelberg game model. We also analyze the changes in the equilibrium solution of the supply chain before and after the input of blockchain technology, identify the conditions for the investment in blockchain technology, and design a “cost-sharing + benefit-sharing” combination contract for the coordination of the blockchain. The results are as follows: Firstly, under decentralized decision-making, if the fresh supplier misreports the freshness of the product, it will mislead the retailer to increase the order quantity, and its own profit will rise. Therefore, the fresh supplier has the motivation to misreport freshness. However, the backlog of fresh products will eventually damage the retailer‘s profit, and the overall profit of the supply chain will also be damaged. Therefore, the increase in the profit of the fresh supplier is at the expense of the overall interests and stability of the supply chain. Second, when the investment cost of blockchain technology is within a certain threshold, it is feasible to invest in blockchain technology. Consumers’ preference for traceable fresh products will encourage the fresh supply chain to improve the level of information traceability and increase investment in blockchain technology. Finally, there are double marginal effects in the fresh supply chain under decentralized decision-making. The combined contract of “cost-sharing + revenue-sharing” can coordinate the overall revenue of the supply chain to the level of centralized decision-making. When the contract parameters meet certain conditions, Pareto improvement in revenue can be achieved for all parties involved in the fresh supply chain. The willingness of retailers to invest in blockchain technology will change with the change in contract parameters. When the proportion of retailers’ costs and the proportion of shared income are higher, the level of retailers’ investment in blockchain technology will decrease. Therefore, the interests of supply chain members need to be balanced in the process of contract coordination.
In this paper, we study the decision-making and coordination problem of a two-tier fresh food supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. Considering the influencing factors of consumers’ information preference, freshness, and misrepresentation, we construct a centralized decision-making model and a decentralized decision-making Stackelberg game model. We also analyze the changes in the equilibrium solution of the supply chain before and after the input of blockchain technology, identify the conditions for the investment in blockchain technology, and design a “cost-sharing + benefit-sharing” combination contract for the coordination of the blockchain. The results are as follows: Firstly, under decentralized decision-making, if the fresh supplier misreports the freshness of the product, it will mislead the retailer to increase the order quantity, and its own profit will rise. Therefore, the fresh supplier has the motivation to misreport freshness. However, the backlog of fresh products will eventually damage the retailer‘s profit, and the overall profit of the supply chain will also be damaged. Therefore, the increase in the profit of the fresh supplier is at the expense of the overall interests and stability of the supply chain. Second, when the investment cost of blockchain technology is within a certain threshold, it is feasible to invest in blockchain technology. Consumers’ preference for traceable fresh products will encourage the fresh supply chain to improve the level of information traceability and increase investment in blockchain technology. Finally, there are double marginal effects in the fresh supply chain under decentralized decision-making. The combined contract of “cost-sharing + revenue-sharing” can coordinate the overall revenue of the supply chain to the level of centralized decision-making. When the contract parameters meet certain conditions, Pareto improvement in revenue can be achieved for all parties involved in the fresh supply chain. The willingness of retailers to invest in blockchain technology will change with the change in contract parameters. When the proportion of retailers’ costs and the proportion of shared income are higher, the level of retailers’ investment in blockchain technology will decrease. Therefore, the interests of supply chain members need to be balanced in the process of contract coordination.
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