Contact Tracing Apps: Lessons Learned on Privacy, Autonomy, and the Need for Detailed and Thoughtful Implementation

Abstract

The global and national response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been inadequate due to a collective lack of preparation and a shortage of available tools for responding to a large-scale pandemic. By applying lessons learned to create better preventative methods and speedier interventions, the harm of a future pandemic may be dramatically reduced. One potential measure is the widespread use of contact tracing apps. While such apps were designed to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, the time scale in which these apps were deployed proved a significant barrier to efficacy. Many companies and governments sprinted to deploy contact tracing apps that were not properly vetted for performance, privacy, or security issues. The hasty development of incomplete contact tracing apps undermined public trust and negatively influenced perceptions of app efficacy. As a result, many of these apps had poor voluntary public uptake, which greatly decreased the apps’ efficacy. Now, with lessons learned from this pandemic, groups can better design and test apps in preparation for the future. In this viewpoint, we outline common strategies employed for contact tracing apps, detail the successes and shortcomings of several prominent apps, and describe lessons learned that may be used to shape effective contact tracing apps for the present and future. Future app designers can keep these lessons in mind to create a version that is suitable for their local culture, especially with regard to local attitudes toward privacy-utility tradeoffs during public health crises.

Effectiveness of Ehteraz digital contact tracing app versus conventional contact tracing in managing the outbreak of COVID-19 in the State of Qatar

“…Signals pass through walls, so people in different rooms could be unnecessarily flagged as having had contact. The result could be a flood of false positives 20 21…”

A methodology for evaluating digital contact tracing apps based on the COVID-19 experience

“…Finally, and regarding the implementation decisions of digital contact tracing for COVID-19, the majority of countries chose the Google/Apple Exposure Notification API as the framework for implementing their apps 39 . This framework implemented a decentralised approach and Opt-in activation, limiting, as we will see, its efficiency.…”

The Korean 3T Practice: New Biosurveillance Model Utilizing New Information Technology and Digital Tools

“…Due to such detailed private information, several media outlets warn that Korean biosurveillance risks violating the privacy and human rights of citizens [ 39 , 40 ]. Scholars are doubtful that the United States and other developed countries can adopt such an aggressive digital contract tracing practice because they are worried about the loss of privacy and civil liberties [ 41 , 42 ]. Later, in June 2020, as a result of acrid debates in terms of privacy issues, the Korean government released a rigid “guideline for public disclosure,” which aims to protect patients from unwanted exposure of their personal identity and privacy.…”