Containing Nationalism: Culture, Economics and Indirect Rule in Corsica

Abstract

Central governments in multinational states frequently deploy indirect rule to contain peripheral nationalism. Through the exchange of economic resources for political control, local notables are co-opted into cementing loyalty to the central state. Although nationalism often has cultural roots, these can fail to bear fruit because indirect rulers prevent them from developing. When the incentives sustaining support for indirect rulers change, this can open a window of opportunity for nationalism. This article examines how culture, institutions and economics influence center-periphery relations, specifically the demand for autonomy and nationalist parties. Utilizing new, disaggregated data and an original survey from the French island of Corsica, we show that indirect rulers have managed to contain nationalist parties in culturally distinct communes, specifically those that are more dependent on public funds. Only where a thriving private sector offers alternatives to state dependence, lessening the force of indirect rule, is cultural distinctiveness associated with nationalist voting.

Peripheral resistance movements: Towards a triangulated research approach

“…However, Lancaster's research focus is not the thesis of peripheral resistance movements as he makes no reference to the correlations between Basques' peripheral identity and their involvement in resistance movements. Similar quantitative studies that focus on testing the empirical relationship between peripheral identity and constitutional preferences were also found in respect of Catalonia (Serrano, 2011, 2013), Scotland (Pattie et al, 1999), Flanders and Wallonia (Billiet et al, 2006), Corsica (Siroky et al, 2021) and so forth. There are also a number of quantitative studies testing the positive impact of peripheral identity on shaping people's voting behaviours.…”

Secession, Territorial Integrity and (Non)-Sovereignty: Why do Some Separatist Movements in the Caribbean Succeed and Others Fail?

“…57-59;Lluch, 2014, pp. 20-24;Siroky et al, 2017, p. 304;Siroky et al, 2020). This article lends empirical support to the latter sub-set of explanations by showing how secession is contingent on continued state protections that allow downsizing to occur in an orderly manner that is consistent with the desire of the international community for geopolitical stability (Coggins, 2014;Griffiths, 2016).…”

“…The upshot is that, in dynamic institutional configurations, communities are less likely to push for full statehood because they have a reasonable expectation that they might win further autonomy in the future. Likewise, Siroky et al (2020) capture the importance of dynamism in their account of how indirect rule, a system in which local notables who profit from the status quo seek to dissuade their communities from pursuing outright nationalism, mitigates against secessionism. The point is that the institutional and geographic context in which these movements take place is key to explaining why some succeed (rather than simply exist without provoking a decisive rupture).…”

Economic Shocks, Mobilization, and Regional Elite Splits

“…3.Siroky et al (2020) find that cultural distinctiveness is associated with support of Corsican political parties in municipalities less dependent on central-state public funds, which supports Rokkan and Urwin’s ideas.…”