Content-Free Awareness: EEG-fcMRI Correlates of Consciousness as Such in an Expert Meditator

Abstract

The minimal neural correlate of the conscious state, regardless of the neural activity correlated with the ever-changing contents of experience, has still not been identified. Different attempts have been made, mainly by comparing the normal waking state to seemingly unconscious states, such as deep sleep or general anesthesia. A more direct approach would be the neuroscientific investigation of conscious states that are experienced as free of any specific phenomenal content. Here we present serendipitous data on content-free awareness (CFA) during an EEG-fMRI assessment reported by an extraordinarily qualified meditator with over 50,000 h of practice. We focused on two specific cortical networks related to external and internal awareness, i.e., the dorsal attention network (DAN) and the default mode network (DMN), to explore the neural correlates of this experience. The combination of high-resolution EEG and ultrafast fMRI enabled us to analyze the dynamic aspects of fMRI connectivity informed by EEG power analysis. The neural correlates of CFA were characterized by a sharp decrease in alpha power and an increase in theta power as well as increases in functional connectivity in the DAN and decreases in the posterior DMN. We interpret these findings as correlates of a top-down-initiated attentional state excluding external sensory stimuli and internal mentation from conscious experience. We conclude that the investigation of states of CFA could provide valuable input for new methodological and conceptual approaches in the search for the minimal neural correlate of consciousness.

Minimal phenomenal experience

“…• Maximally satisfied Low Complexity plus maximal Wakefulness would lead to what I have termed "full-absorption episodes". In such episodes, the hypothetical phenomenal character of MPE would become a stand-alone feature; "pure awareness" would be the only aspect that could later be reported (see Winter et al, 2020, for a recent single-case study). Empirically plausible examples are "witness consciousness" 11 during lucid dreamless sleep (for an introduction, see section 5 in Metzinger, 2019) and deep meditative states during the practice of calm abiding and highly focused attention, for example in Buddhist jhāna practice.…”

Understanding the Nature of Oneness Experience in Meditators Using Collective Intelligence Methods

“…The fact that these fundamental perceptual categories appear to drive or influence related OSPs is consistent with many descriptions of oneness/non-dual awareness that describe it primarily as a perceptually related shift, for example, in perception (Adyashanti, 2009;Mills et al, 2018), perceptual stance (Krägeloh, 2019), or perspective (de Castro, 2017; Schoenberg and Vago, 2019), Or more specifically a shift in self-perception (Brown and Engler, 1980;Mills et al, 2018), self-perspective (Hanley et al, 2018), or identity (Paul, 2008), for example, where "awareness is viewing the self rather than the self being aware of the experience" (de Castro, 2017, p. 3). More generally, this alteration of time, space, and identity/body is commonly seen in altered states of consciousness research (Tart, 1972;Travis and Pearson, 2000;Shanon, 2003;Vaitl et al, 2005;Hunt, 2007;Ataria and Neria, 2013;de Castro, 2017), with evidence of different neural activity (Berkovich-Ohana et al, 2013;Krause, 2018;Winter et al, 2020;Wittmann, 2020) underlying the experiences of timelessness (outside time) and spacelessness (outside space), related to alterations in the sense of the body and experiences of "then" and "there." Within contextual behavioral science (Moran et al, 2018), self-as-context is defined as "the coming together [...] of a cluster of deictic relations (especially I/Here/Now) that enable observation and description from a perspective or point of view [which] enables or facilitates many different experiences, including [...] a transcendent sense of self.…”

Inner Experience – Direct Access to Reality: A Complementarist Ontology and Dual Aspect Monism Support a Broader Epistemology

“…This was, eventually, also connected back to neuroscience: Varela was the first to postulate a phenomenology of experience as a complement to neuroscientific methods (Varela et al, 1991). This has inspired a strand of research within neuroscience that calls itself contemplative neuroscience (Shear, 2007;Berkovich-Ohana et al, 2013;Dor-Ziderman et al, 2013;Jo et al, 2013Jo et al, , 2014Jo et al, , 2015Lutz et al, 2015;Winter et al, 2020). This refers to a scientific model of experience, where neuroscientific methods, such as electroencephalogram (EEG), MRI, magnetoencephalogram (MEG), or others, are used to understand brain states or dynamics-experience of the outer world or third-person types of experience.…”