Contesting epistemic authority: Conspiracy theories on the boundaries of science

Abstract

Conspiracy theories are immensely popular today, yet in the social sciences they are often dismissed as "irrational," "bad science," or "religious belief." In this study, we take a cultural sociological approach and argue that this persistent disqualification is a form of "boundary work" that obscures rather than clarifies how and why conspiracy theorists challenge the epistemic authority of science. Based on a qualitative study of the Dutch conspiracy milieu, we distinguish three critiques that are motivated by encounters with scientific experts in everyday life: the alleged dogmatism of modern science, the intimate relation of scientific knowledge production with vested interests, and the exclusion of lay knowledge by scientific experts forming a global "power elite." Given their critique that resonates with social scientific understandings of science, it is concluded that conspiracy theorists compete with (social) scientists in complex battles for epistemic authority in a broader field of knowledge contestation.

Online communication as a window to conspiracist worldviews

“…They can be seen in the comment sections of many major news websites, for example, providing an underground counterpoint to the views expressed in the parent article (cf. Sapountzis and Condor, 2013; Harambam and Aupers, 2015). As the visibility of conspiracy theories has increased, so too has the volume of research into the psychology of conspiracy belief.…”

Believing in Conspiracy Theories: Evidence from an Exploratory Analysis of Italian Survey Data

“…Conspiracy theories are often considered a pathology (Fenster 1999) since they assume as true unproved conjectures, repeatedly rejected by the scientific community (Harambam & Aupers 2015). These theories ascribe to particular agents (usually defined as conspirators) an extraordinary capacity to influence personal and collective decisions, to forecast the consequences of their actions, to maintain secrecy about their strategies, and to coordinate themselves in a way that goes well beyond what is realistic in an open society (Sunstein & Vermeule 2009;Sunstein 2014).…”

Understanding Conspiracy Online: Social Media and the Spread of Suspicious Thinking

“…They offer a variety of possible explanations for this, including the possibility that subjects primed to think analytically merely selected a more rational seeming solution rather than reporting on their true beliefs (Swami et al, 2014). By combining this result with Einstein and Glick's, it may be that users who are challenged directly on their conspiracy beliefs 'retreat' from them, perhaps to avoid being seen as "crazy", as noted previously in Harambam's (2015) and Auper's (2012) works. It is also possible that engaging in a critical discourse may encourage analytic thinking and broaden perceptions.…”

“…Overall Aupers (2012) argues that this growth in conspiracy thinking is simply a natural response to modernity. Harambam and Aupers (2015) built off of Aupers' 2012 work in a survey that attempted to understand conspiracy theorists as "contesting the boundaries of science" (p. 470). Participants in their study each held critical stances toward modern institutions, and an assumption that there was some form of external control over their collective lives (Aupers, 2012, pp.…”