Contests with Alternative Public‐Good Prizes

Abstract

I study contests in which a society of players compete, by expending irreversible effort, over which one of alternative prizes should be awarded to them by the decision maker. The prizes are public goods and/or public bads for the players. The players choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently. I define each player's valuation spread as the difference between his valuations for the two public‐good/public‐bad prizes. I establish that the players' equilibrium effort levels depend solely on their valuation spreads, and that the players never expend positive effort for both prizes in equilibrium. Further, I establish that in equilibrium only players with the widest positive valuation spread and players with the widest negative valuation spread expend positive effort. Finally, I establish that the equilibrium effort level expended for each prize and the equilibrium total effort level are determined only by the widest positive valuation spread and the widest negative valuation spread.

A subscription vs. appropriation framework for natural resource conflicts

“…4 Contributions include Katz et al [1990], Ursprung [1990], Gradstein [1993], Riaz et al [1995]. Baik [2008Baik [ , 2016, Epstein and Mealem [2009], Nitzan and Ueda [2009], Esteban and Ray [2001, 2011a, 2011b, Lee [2012], Kolmar and Rommeswinkel [2013], Chowdhury et al [2013], Dasgupta [2017], Dasgupta [2018, 2020], Cheikbossian and Fayat [2018], Dasgupta and Guha Neogi [2018] and Baik and Jung [2020]. 5 Esteban and Ray [2011a], Dasgupta [2017], Dasgupta [2018, 2020] and Dasgupta and Guha Neogi [2018] are examples of such recent application.…”

A Subscription vs. Appropriation Framework for Natural Resource Conflicts

“…See, for example,Murphy et al [1993],Grossman and Kim [1995],Anderton et al [1999],Noh [2002],Hausken [2005],Caruso [2010], Dal Dal Bo [2011, 2012],Mitra and Ray [2014],Cornes et al [2019] andBakshi and Dasgupta [2020].4 Contributions includeKatz et al [1990],Ursprung [1990],Gradstein [1993],Riaz et al [1995] Baik [2008Baik [ , 2016,Epstein and Mealem [2009],Nitzan and Ueda [2009],Esteban and Ray [2001, 2011a, 2011b,Lee [2012],Kolmar and Rommeswinkel [2013],Chowdhury et al [2013],Dasgupta [2017],. Dasgupta [2018, 2020],Cheikbossian and Fayat [2018],Dasgupta and Guha Neogi [2018] andBaik and Jung [2020].5 Esteban and Ray [2011a],Dasgupta [2017], Dasgupta [2018, 2020] andDasgupta and Guha Neogi [2018] are examples of such recent application.6 One partial exception isGradstein [1993].…”

Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests

“…For the analysis of these cases refer to the multiple equilibria results in Katz, Nitzan, and Rosenberg (). For more recent approaches see also Baik () and references therein.…”