Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents

Parreiras, Sérgio O.; Rubinchik, Anna

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.007

Cited by 57 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…see Krishna andMorgan 1997, Moldovanu andSela 2001) and for asymmetric settings (i.e., for ex ante different solvers; see Amann and Leininger 1996, Parreiras and Rubinchik 2010, Siegel 2014a). The central concern in much of this literature is exploring how solvers can be induced to provide good solutions on average (Krishna andMorgan 1997, Moldovanu andSela 2001).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Sourcing Innovation: Public and Private Feedback in Contests

Mihm

Schlapp

2015

SSRN Journal

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Contests, in which contestants compete for a prize offered by a contest holder, have become a popular way to source innovation. Despite great interest from the academic community, many important managerial aspects of contests have received very little formal inquiry. The most important of these is feedback from the contest holder to the contestants while the contest unfolds. This paper sets out to establish a comprehensive understanding of how to give feedback in a contest by answering the questions of when to give feedback and when not to give feedback and which type of feedback to give, public (which all solvers can observe) or private (which only the concerned party can observe). We find that feedback will not affect the behavior of competing problem solvers unless the contest holder credibly precommits to a truthful feedback policy. We then set up a framework that reduces the feedback decision to a pair of conceptual questions. First: Is the contest's ultimate objective to increase average quality or to find the best solution? Second: How uncertain are outcomes for the solvers? We show that no feedback or public feedback generally dominate private feedback. However, if the host is interested exclusively in the best performance and if the contest displays large uncertainties, private feedback is optimal.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Sourcing Innovation: Public and Private Feedback in Contests

Mihm

Schlapp

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…(For the case of loss aversion see Cornes and Hartley (2012a).) The only existing works on risk aversion for the incomplete information all-pay auction of which we are aware are Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2006), Cingottini and Menicucci (2006), and Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010). 4 Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2006) show that an analytic characterisation of equilibrium strategies cannot be usually obtained for von Neumann-Morgenstern risk-averse players.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Their result, which is contrary to the monotonicity of revenue in the risk neutral case, is obtained provided that bidders are either highly risk averse or very likely to possess a particular, known valuation. Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) analyse bidding behaviour in contests where three or more players draw their valuations from asymmetric supports and may have asymmetric attitudes toward risk. They find that these ex-ante asymmetries may lead to player drop-out or, for sufficiently risk-averse players, the use of discontinuous 'all-or-nothing' strategies.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The existing analyses of asymmetric auctions, for instance Amann and Leininger (1996), Lizzeri and Persico (2000), Maskin and Riley (2000), Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2004), Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010), Kirkegaard (2012), or Kaplan and Zamir (2012), typically employ asymmetric distributions (or supports) while we use our idiosyncratic varianceaversion parameter. Next to Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010), to the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the only paper to analyse bidding in a contest when players are asymmetric in their degree of risk-aversion. For accounts of auctions under ambiguity see, for instance, Bose and Daripa (2009), and for a more general approach to mechanism design under ambiguity, see Bodoh-Creed (2012).…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Auctioning Risk: The All-Pay Auction under Mean-Variance Preferences

Klose

Schweinzer

2012

SSRN Journal

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We analyse the all-pay auction with incomplete information and variance-averse bidders. We characterise the symmetric equilibrium for general distributions of valuations and any number of bidders. Variance aversion is a sufficient assumption to predict that high-valuation bidders increase their bids relative to the risk-neutral case while low types decrease their bid. Considering an asymmetric two-player environment with uniform valuations, we show that a more variance-averse type always bids higher than her less variance-averse counterpart. Taking mean-variance bidding behaviour as given, we show that an expected revenue maximising seller may want to optimally limit the number of participants. (JEL C7, D7, D81.

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“…8 For further discussions of asymmetric all-pay auctions see, for instance, Riley (1989), Fibich, Gavious, andSela (2006), Parreiras andRubinchik (2010), or Szech (2011). For a detailed discussion, we appeal, again, to the above cited survey literature.…”

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confidence: 99%

All-pay-all aspects of political decision making

Giebe

Schweinzer

2013

Public Choice

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. All-pay-all Aspects of Political Decision Making Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe study decision making processes with non-standard all-pay structures. We motivate this interest through a group of regulatory, political, legal, military, and economic applications where individual actions determine the consequences for a larger group or the public. The common features of these examples are a competitive environment, winner-take-all reward structure, and some form of all-pay-all payment rule.JEL-Code: C700, D700, L500.

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Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents

Cited by 57 publications

References 19 publications

Sourcing Innovation: Public and Private Feedback in Contests

Sourcing Innovation: Public and Private Feedback in Contests

Auctioning Risk: The All-Pay Auction under Mean-Variance Preferences

All-pay-all aspects of political decision making

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