The problem `human and work' in a model working group is investigated by
means of cellular automata technique. Attitude of members of a group towards
work is measured by an indicator of loyalty to the group (the number of agents
who carry out their tasks), and lack of loyalty (the number of agents, who give
their tasks to other agents). Initially, all agents realize scheduled tasks
one-by-one. Agents with the number of scheduled tasks larger than a given
threshold change their strategy to unloyal one and start avoiding completing
tasks by passing them to their colleagues. Optionally, in some conditions, we
allow agents to return to loyal state; hence the rule is hysteretic. Results
are presented on an influence of i) the density of tasks, ii) the threshold
number of tasks assigned to the agents' forcing him/her for strategy change on
the system efficiency. We show that a `black' scenario of the system stacking
in a `jammed phase' (with all agents preferring unloyal strategy and having
plenty tasks scheduled for realization) may be avoided when return to loyalty
is allowed and either i) the number of agents chosen for task realization, or
ii) the number of assigned tasks, or iii) the threshold value of assigned
tasks, which force the agent to conversion from loyal strategy to unloyal one,
or iv) the threshold value of tasks assigned to unloyal agent, which force
him/her to task redistribution among his/her neighbors, are smartly chosen.Comment: 15 pages, 10 figures, 2 table