Contextual Emergence in the Description of Properties

Bishop, Robert C.; Atmanspacher, Harald

doi:10.1007/s10701-006-9082-8

Cited by 108 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…The stability is an important part of the Perlovsky's convergent states of dynamic logic processes during which the internal representations of a system are getting more definite and crisp, and become fit to the input signals [73]. Thus, according to the concept of contextual emergence [298,299], Grossberg resonance [111] and Perlovsky convergent states [73], the condition of stability does not depend only on the neurobiological level. It also depends on features of mental representations at the dominantas persist over long periods in the higher levels of the nervous system, and with complete or partial recovery of the initial conditions, they can completely or partially reappear.…”

Section: Eeg Functional Connectivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural world physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time

Fingelkurts

Neves

2010

Physics of Life Reviews

168

233

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Concepts of space and time are widely developed in physics. However, there is a considerable lack of biologically plausible theoretical frameworks that can demonstrate how space and time dimensions are implemented in the activity of the most complex life-system -the brain with a mind. Brain activity is organized both temporally and spatially, thus representing space-time in the brain. Critical analysis of recent research on the space-time organization of the brain's activity pointed to the existence of so-called operational space-time in the brain. This space-time is limited to the execution of brain operations of differing complexity. During each such brain operation a particular short-term spatio-temporal pattern of integrated activity of different brain areas emerges within related operational space-time. At the same time, to have a fully functional human brain one needs to have a subjective mental experience. Current research on the subjective mental experience offers detailed analysis of space-time organization of the mind. According to this research, subjective mental experience (subjective virtual world) has definitive spatial and temporal properties similar to many physical phenomena. Based on systematic review of the propositions and tenets of brain and mind space-time descriptions, our aim in this review essay is to explore the relations between the two. To be precise, we would like to discuss the hypothesis that via the brain operational space-time the mind subjective space-time is connected to otherwise distant physical space-time reality.Key words: spatial, temporal, consciousness, cognition, operation, architectonics, EEG, field, metastability, physics, coordinative dynamics, self-organization, cortex.

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Section: Eeg Functional Connectivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural world physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time

Fingelkurts

Neves

2010

Physics of Life Reviews

168

233

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“…But I commend what follows to advocates of top-down causation, such as that of Ellis and Atmanspacher, Auletta, Bishop, Jaeger and O'Connor. For I think it makes precise some of their claims: such as that higher level facts or events constrain, modify or form a context for the lower level, which is therefore not independent of the higher level [22]; or that lower level facts or events are necessary but not sufficient for higher level ones [21].…”

Section: Causationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Laws, causation and dynamics at different levels

Butterfield

2011

Interface Focus.

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I have two main aims. The first is general, and more philosophical (§2). The second is specific, and more closely related to physics (§§3 and 4). The first aim is to state my general views about laws and causation at different ‘levels’. The main task is to understand how the higher levels sustain notions of law and causation that ‘ride free’ of reductions to the lower level or levels. I endeavour to relate my views to those of other symposiasts. The second aim is to give a framework for describing dynamics at different levels, emphasizing how the various levels' dynamics can mesh or fail to mesh. This framework is essentially that of elementary dynamical systems theory. The main idea will be, for simplicity, to work with just two levels, dubbed ‘micro’ and ‘macro’, which are related by coarse-graining. I use this framework to describe, in part, the first four of Ellis' five types of top-down causation.

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“…On a pluralist metaphysical interpretation, these local 'levels' are real but do not correspond to global, nominalized designations and encourage a more tempered view of whether the sciences deliver a relatively unified world picture. The rejection of assumptions about causation across universal 'levels' of organization that do not correspond to the epistemological details found in scientific practice [52,59] and the development of more sophisticated accounts of hierarchical relations [60,61] are the most promising routes to inferring metaphysical conclusions from the local layers of organization that arise from diverse and incompatible hierarchies represented within and across the sciences. On the reasoning explication model of how science and philosophy interact [57], these types of analyses also hold methodological and epistemological promise for advancing ongoing investigation into the natural world.…”

Section: A Productive Interface For Philosophy and Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

Hierarchy, causation and explanation: ubiquity, locality and pluralism

Love

2011

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The ubiquity of top-down causal explanations within and across the sciences is prima facie evidence for the existence of top-down causation. Much debate has been focused on whether top-down causation is coherent or in conflict with reductionism. Less attention has been given to the question of whether these representations of hierarchical relations pick out a single, common hierarchy. A negative answer to this question undermines a commonplace view that the world is divided into stratified 'levels' of organization and suggests that attributions of causal responsibility in different hierarchical representations may not have a meaningful basis for comparison. Representations used in top-down and bottom-up explanations are primarily 'local' and tied to distinct domains of science, illustrated here by protein structure and folding. This locality suggests that no single metaphysical account of hierarchy for causal relations to obtain within emerges from the epistemology of scientific explanation. Instead, a pluralist perspective is recommended-many different kinds of top-down causation (explanation) can exist alongside many different kinds of bottom-up causation (explanation). Pluralism makes plausible why different senses of top-down causation can be coherent and not in conflict with reductionism, thereby illustrating a productive interface between philosophical analysis and scientific inquiry.

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Contextual Emergence in the Description of Properties

Cited by 108 publications

References 44 publications

Natural world physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time

Natural world physical, brain operational, and mind phenomenal space–time

Laws, causation and dynamics at different levels

Hierarchy, causation and explanation: ubiquity, locality and pluralism

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