Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to § 2 Sherman Act

Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries

“…Legal studies of post-Soviet courts stress the low level of compensation for damages as an important problem (see, for example, Hendley 2014) that impedes deterrence. This extends a step further from the European concept of dominant position as a basis for the special responsibilities of the dominant company (Larouche and Schinkel 2013), which are derived from ordo-liberal tradition. In addition to the low level of compensation for damages, and especially for moral damages, as well as the unclear difference between compensation for damages and compensation for moral damages, the causal links between the actions of an offender and the harm of a victim are established using relatively weak standards in Russian legal practice (Maggs et al 2015).…”

The Relationship Between Antitrust and Regulation in the Us and the Eu: Can Legal Tradition Account for the Differences?

“…156 The experience with laissez-faire policies at the turn of the 20th century, however, had shown that market economy left to its own devices would eventually lead to the concentration of economic power in private hands, 157 which constituted a major threat to the free economic order advocated by ordo-liberals. 158 Freiburg School scholars, therefore, did not regard markets as self-correcting, but rather as fragile creatures 159 to be preserved by vigorous antitrust enforcement and, in the case of natural monopolies, even price regulation. 160 But how could such a far-reaching antitrust intervention be reconciled with the risk of error due to information asymmetries?…”