Contingent Objects, Contingent Propositions, and Essentialism

Abstract

Trevor Teitel (2017) has recently argued that combining the assumption that modality reduces to essence with the assumption that possibly some objects contingently exist leads to problems if one wishes to uphold that the logic of metaphysical modality is S5. In this paper I will argue that there is a way for the essentialist to evade the problem described by Teitel. The proposed solution crucially involves the assumption that some propositions possibly fail to exist. I will show how this assumption affords a motivated contingentist response to Teitel’s argument.

The Uniqueness of Necessary Truth and the Status of S4 and S5

“…9 For reasons to reject S4 and S5 given an interpretation in terms of essence see, for example,Teitel (2019) andDitter (2020). For a reply toTeitel (2019), seeWerner (2021). 10 See, for example,Stalnaker (1976Stalnaker ( , 1984 andLewis (1986).…”