Continuous improvement and “Continuous Improvement”

Forbes, Kevin

doi:10.5694/j.1326-5377.2005.tb06770.x

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…In short, what this means is that the Big Three are becoming more important to the Carbon Majors as a source of equity financing, while the Carbon Majors are becoming less important to the Big Three as a source of their overall returns. This puts the Big Three in a position to exercise significant influence over the Wyatt (1998), Fender (2003, Forbes (2005), Investment Management Association (2006), Wyatt (2006), Asia Asset Management (2009, Barr (2010), Bogle (2011), Investments & Pensions Europe (2014, 2015, 2016, Housel (2017), Kozlowski (2018), Delventhal (2019), Zacks Equity Research (2020), Square Well Partners (2021), ADV Ratings (2022). Note: 22 observations were recorded for Vanguard's total AUM in the period 1998 to 2021, where Vanguard's total AUM data is missing it is interpolated.…”

Section: Owning Emissions: Who Holds Carbon Major Equity?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Source: Bloomberg Professional (2021). Vanguard total AUM data fromWyatt (1998), Fender (2003,Forbes (2005), Investment Management Association (2006),Wyatt (2006), Asia Asset Management (2009),Barr (2010),Bogle (2011), Investments & Pensions Europe (2014, 2015, 2016,Housel (2017),Kozlowski (2018),Delventhal (2019), Zacks Equity Research (2020), Square Well Partners (2021), ADV Ratings (2022). Note: 22 observations were recorded for Vanguard's total AUM in the period 1998 to 2021, where Vanguard's total AUM data is missing it is interpolated.…”

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confidence: 99%

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From passive owners to planet savers? Asset managers, carbon majors and the limits of sustainable finance

Baines

Hager

2022

Competition & Change

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This article examines the role of the Big Three asset management firms – BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street – in corporate environmental governance. Specifically, it investigates the Big Three’s relationships with the publicly listed Carbon Majors: a small group of fossil fuels, cement and mining companies responsible for the bulk of industrial greenhouse gas emissions. Engaging with the corporate governance concepts of ownership and control, and exit and voice, it charts the rise to prominence of the Big Three, including their environmental, social and governance (ESG) funds, in the ownership of the Carbon Majors. Having established their status as key sources of permanent capital that are unlikely to exit from their investment positions in the world’s most polluting publicly listed corporations, the article examines how control may be exercised through voice by analysing the Big Three’s proxy voting record at Carbon Major annual general meetings. It finds that they more frequently oppose rather than support shareholder resolutions aimed at improving environmental governance and that their voting is more likely to lead to the failure than to the success of these resolutions. Remarkably, there is little to distinguish the proxy voting of the Big Three’s ESG funds from their non-ESG funds. Regardless of whether these resolutions succeeded or failed, they also tend to be narrow in scope and piecemeal in nature. Overall, the article raises serious doubts about the Big Three’s credentials as environmental stewards and argues instead that they are little more than stewards of the status quo of shareholder value maximization.

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