2014
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_20
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Continuous Non-malleable Codes

Abstract: Abstract. Non-malleable codes are a natural relaxation of error correcting/detecting codes that have useful applications in the context of tamper resilient cryptography. Informally, a code is non-malleable if an adversary trying to tamper with an encoding of a given message can only leave it unchanged or modify it to the encoding of a completely unrelated value. This paper introduces an extension of the standard non-malleability security notion -so-called continuous non-malleability -where we allow the adversa… Show more

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Cited by 95 publications
(119 citation statements)
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“…To our knowledge, we can use the explicit constructions (of the non-malleable codes) in the work [23,11,44,24,26,1,3]. First we overview different classes of tampering/leakage function allowed for these results: the constructions of [23] work for bit-wise tampering functions, and split-state functions in the random oracle model.…”
Section: Instantiationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To our knowledge, we can use the explicit constructions (of the non-malleable codes) in the work [23,11,44,24,26,1,3]. First we overview different classes of tampering/leakage function allowed for these results: the constructions of [23] work for bit-wise tampering functions, and split-state functions in the random oracle model.…”
Section: Instantiationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In particular, it does not include functions of the form f (c) := Enc(h(Dec(c))), since Dec(f (Enc(m))) = h(m) is clearly related to m. One of the largest and practically relevant tampering families for which we can construct NMCs is the so-called split-state tampering family where the codeword is split into two parts c 1 c 2 , and the adversary is only allowed to tamper with c 1 , c 2 independently to get f 1 (c 1 ) f 2 (c 2 ). A lot of the aforementioned results [LL12,DKO13,ADL14,CG14b,FMNV14] have studied NMCs against split-state tampering. [ADL14] gave the first (and the only one so far) information-theoretically secure construction in the split-state model from n-bit messages to n 7 log 7 n-bit codewords (i.e., code rate n 6 log 7 n).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Unfortunately, we show that no standard non-malleable code (as originally defined by Dziembowski et al [17] and Faust et al [18]) can achieve this notion (see Section B). Fortunately, we observe that the NMC concept can be extended to allow the decoder to make use of (an initially generated) secret state, which simply becomes part of the secret key in the combined scheme.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 78%