Contra‐Associational Strategy in a Hybrid Regime: Ecuador, 2007–2015

Abstract

Over the last decade, political scientists have identified Ecuador as one of Latin America's hybrid regimes. This article examines how President Rafael Correa combined legal reforms, bureaucratic controls and other policies in a contra‐associational strategy aimed at extending executive control over civil society. While the strategy significantly altered the operational environment for civil society groups, it did not completely strip them of their capacity to oppose the regime. Ecuador's experience underscores the ambiguity at play in hybrids; in pursuit of regime legitimation, regimes must cede some space to opponents while simultaneously sabotaging civil liberties.

Paying for ecological services in Ecuador: The political economy of structural inequality

“…During the early days of the Revolución Ciudadana , the Correa administration consolidated power by aligning with Indigenous and environmental groups and leaders (de la Torre, 2013; Novo, 2021; Riofrancos, 2020). However, as Indigenous demands for land, language and political autonomy have become increasingly pronounced, successive administrations have distanced themselves from civil society, consolidating what political scientist Catherine Conaghan (2017) has called a ‘contra‐associational strategy’ of removing special status, expanding technocratic regulation and actively targeting and pitting civil society groups and leaders against one another (de la Torre, 2013; McBurney et al, 2021).…”

“…As noted earlier, the Ecuadorian state has used a combination of clientelism and ‘technocratic populism’ to manage the demands of Indigenous peoples and organizations (Conaghan, 2017; de la Torre, 2013). During the Correa Administration, state intervention took the form of public investment in roads, health clinics and ‘millennium’ schools (Tuaza, 2018).…”

Ecuador after Correa: The Struggle over the “Citizens' Revolution”

“…Ecuador's fiscal deficit has continued to widen and, in 2017, reached 6% of GDP (BBC 2017b, reporting World Bank data). President Moreno has continued to reduce public spending and has started to openly talk about austerity measures, even if he promised to exempt social spending from any 1 On Correa's confrontational rhetoric and authoritarian style of governing, see for instance Conaghan (2017), De la Torre (2013, 2016), Freidenberg (2012), Pachano (2010), and Rojas and Llanos-Escobar (2016). budget cuts (El Universo 2017a; Labarthe and Saint-Upéry 2017: 36-37).…”

“…In any case, despite having apparently defeated Correa for the time being, President Moreno heads a government that is decidedly weak in many regards. Politically, he is 16 See, for instance, Conaghan (2017) For a critical analysis, see Andrade and Nicholls (2017).…”