Contracting for Property Rights

Libecap, Gary D.

doi:10.2307/j.ctv301f7w.14

Cited by 265 publications

(167 citation statements)

References 31 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

151

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The property rights view holds that whenever a stakeholder legally owns a value-generating resource, she will be able to appropriate the value thus created (Asher et al, 2005;Collis and Montgomery, 1998: 39). Private ownership of a value-generating resource may involve a variety of property rights, including the right to exclude nonowners from access, the right to appropriate the stream of economic rents from use of and investments in the resource, and the right to sell the resource to others (Libecap, 1989). In a simple situation where there is only one resource required in the value-creation process and this resource is legally owned by a stakeholder, one would expect neutral VCA (elasticity = 1) since the owner of such resource can fully claim and capture the value generated.…”

Section: Concluding Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incremental value creation and appropriation in a world with multiple stakeholders

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Concluding Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incremental value creation and appropriation in a world with multiple stakeholders

2014

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Some of these specific rights and responsibilities are highly formal and administered by statutory or religious laws, while others are informal and based on oral traditions and customs. All sorts of societies and settings, including peri-urban areas, have their own tenure arrangements that help to specify the rights of and restrictions on individuals or groups of individuals with regard to access to and the use of land (Libecap, 1989).…”

Section: Background: Land-tenure Arrangements In Ethiopiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Land Tenure in the Changing Peri‐Urban Areas of Ethiopia: The Case of Bahir Dar City

Adam

2014

Int J Urban Regional Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Ethiopia's urban expansion and development strategy has been based on the acquisition of land by government from adjacent peri-urban areas. The land in the peri-urban areas is predominantly agricultural in nature, and it has been held by local farmers or landholders. This article aims to examine the nature of urban expansion and development from the perspective of the land rights of the local peri-urban landholders. To achieve this purpose, it has employed a case-study approach. As urban territory extends into adjacent peri-urban areas, the land rights of local landholders are expected to be automatically cancelled and transferred to people who can pay for a lease. This shows that very little attention is paid to the land rights of local landholders in peri-urban areas in the process of urban expansion and development. Therefore, it is not difficult to imagine that local landholders in those areas have a prevailing sense of insecurity about their land.

show abstract

“…In the context of planning, Alexander (2001) propose attributes related to interdependence, uncertainty, and timing. Other sources of transactions costs are identified, which include bounded rationality and broad past experience (Libecap, 1989;Mettepenningen,Verspecht, & Huylenbroeck, 2009), opportunism, complexity, information asymmetric, trust and confidence in information (Ducos and Dupraz, 2007;Ducos et al, 2009;Williamson, 1975). The above identified factors help to develop attributes and sub-attributes of transaction costs in implementing TDR programs in the following, which constitute the theoretical framework of this research.…”

Section: Factors Influencing Transaction Costsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implementation analysis of transfer of development rights for conserving privately owned built heritage in Hong Kong: A transactions costs perspective

Hou

Shahab

et al. 2019

Growth and Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Transfer of development rights (TDR) programs are introduced as an alternative institutional innovation to the traditional regulatory instruments for land development. They meet the demand for development and conservation while balancing the conflicts between public and private interests with minimal use of public funds. Most TDR literature is about nature conservation and there is little focus on the complicated process and diverse stakeholders’ interests of urban land use in dealing with built heritage conservation. Previous studies show that the success of TDR programs depends on various elements, especially policy design and implementation approaches. The design and implementation of TDR programs involves transaction costs that can reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of these programs. This paper aims at developing a framework for analyzing TDR programs. This proposed framework not only takes transactions costs into account, but also provides a basis for decision makers to decipher the process of informal TDR. Using Hong Kong as a case study, three TDR implementation modes are selected to examine how different informal institutional arrangements have resulted in specific transaction costs in practice and hindered TDR projects. Our findings, which are informed by transactions costs economics, provide practical insights in order to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of TDR programs, particularly in informal contexts.

show abstract

Contracting for Property Rights

Cited by 265 publications

References 31 publications

Incremental value creation and appropriation in a world with multiple stakeholders

Incremental value creation and appropriation in a world with multiple stakeholders

Land Tenure in the Changing Peri‐Urban Areas of Ethiopia: The Case of Bahir Dar City

Implementation analysis of transfer of development rights for conserving privately owned built heritage in Hong Kong: A transactions costs perspective

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About