2019
DOI: 10.3390/infrastructures4030041
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Contracting for Road Maintenance in the Netherlands—The Downside of Performance-Based Contracting

Abstract: A trend towards performance-based contracting (PBC) can be observed in public infrastructure maintenance. PBC is an approach of tying the contractor’s payment to specified performance. We investigated PBC for the maintenance of highways and roads in the Netherlands, identifying issues ultimately resulting in poor contractor performance. The PBC-induced risks for clients relate to the problematic translation and measurement of specifications, the ineffectiveness of incentives, the avoidance of contractors takin… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Contract duration, activity type, and contract size-the large projects with strong competition, long duration and extension periods, long outsourced road sections that incorporate crack sealing, pothole repair, illumination repair/maintenance, and mowing activities, and favour PBMC [8] Cumulative equivalent single axle load, speed of construction work, the traffic, and rainfall have been used in the game theory and the simulation for the optimization of benefit for the client and profit for the contractor [9] Performance levels and contractual performance criteria [4], [12] and thresholds for applying penalties/ incentives [13]-mathematical optimization models and a computational tool have been developed in order to meet contractual conditions: (1) types of performance indicators; (2) their threshold levels; and (3) the appropriate levels of penalties and incentives [10] Risks allocation between the participants [2,4,14,15]: if too much risk is allocated to the contractor, the price will be high, and if too little risk is transferred, then the goal of obtaining efficiency and effectiveness of the contract is not achieved [9] e method of contractor selection-cost reductions was largest when contractors faced strong competition and have gained experiences with PBCs [5] Based on the analysed literature, the factors influencing the pilot project implementation can be divided as follows:…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Contract duration, activity type, and contract size-the large projects with strong competition, long duration and extension periods, long outsourced road sections that incorporate crack sealing, pothole repair, illumination repair/maintenance, and mowing activities, and favour PBMC [8] Cumulative equivalent single axle load, speed of construction work, the traffic, and rainfall have been used in the game theory and the simulation for the optimization of benefit for the client and profit for the contractor [9] Performance levels and contractual performance criteria [4], [12] and thresholds for applying penalties/ incentives [13]-mathematical optimization models and a computational tool have been developed in order to meet contractual conditions: (1) types of performance indicators; (2) their threshold levels; and (3) the appropriate levels of penalties and incentives [10] Risks allocation between the participants [2,4,14,15]: if too much risk is allocated to the contractor, the price will be high, and if too little risk is transferred, then the goal of obtaining efficiency and effectiveness of the contract is not achieved [9] e method of contractor selection-cost reductions was largest when contractors faced strong competition and have gained experiences with PBCs [5] Based on the analysed literature, the factors influencing the pilot project implementation can be divided as follows:…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to the above deduction, the general expression of the probability which performing CM at the λth inspection can be expressed as Eq. ( 17): (15) where…”
Section: Probability Of Corrective Renewalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In recent years, PBC has been widely applied in various fields, therefore the amount of academic research related to PBC is also gradually increasing. Nevertheless, the main research attention is put on contracts [11,12], risks [13][14][15][16], incentives [17], and performance metrics [18]. Tan [11] proposed a new analytical model, which helps to determine the parameters and analyze contracts.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In recent years, with the wide application of PBC, the research on PBC has gradually increased. However, most existing studies on PBC concentrate on contracts [13,14], risks [15][16][17][18], incentives [19,20], and performance metrics [21]. Tan [14] developed a distribution-free contract that sets the guaranteed energy savings level based on the mean and the standard deviation of the energy savings and the profit-sharing ratio between the energy service companies (ESCO) and the energy user.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%