Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain

Hassidim, Avinatan; Romm, Assaf; Shorrer, Ran I.

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.025

Economics Letters

2019

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.025

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Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain

Avinatan Hassidim

Assaf Romm

Ran I. Shorrer

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2020

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“…Colleges' preferences are not unilaterally substitutable(Hassidim et al, 2019;Hatfield and Kojima, 2010), nor do they meet any other condition that guarantees the existence of a student-optimal stable allocation.14 The substitutable completions approach of Hatfield and Kominers guarantees existence, but it is not guaranteed to identify all stable allocations. Indeed, one can verify that, in Example 1, for any substitutable completion of the college's choice function, Y SP−DA is the unique allocation that is stable with respect to the completion.…”

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Need versus Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets

Bíró¹,

Hassidim²,

Romm³

et al. 2020

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This paper studies the set of stable allocations in college admissions markets where students can attend the same college under different financial terms. The stable deferred acceptance mechanism implicitly allocates funding based on merit. In Hungary, where the centralized mechanism is based on deferred acceptance, an alternate stable algorithm would change the assignment of 9.3 percent of the applicants, and increase the number of assigned applicants by 2 percent. Low socioeconomic status applicants and colleges in the periphery benefit disproportionately from moving to this non-merit-based algorithm. These findings stand in sharp contrast to findings from the matching (without contracts) literature.* This version: October, 2020. The Hungarian Higher Education Application Database (FELVI) is owned by the Hungarian Education Bureau (Oktatasi Hivatal). The data were processed by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS-CERS).

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confidence: 99%

Need versus Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets

Bíró¹,

Hassidim²,

Romm³

et al. 2020

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain

Cited by 1 publication

References 12 publications

Need versus Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets

Need versus Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets

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