Contrary-to-Duty Scenarios, Deontic Dilemmas, and Transmission Principles

Abstract

Actualists hold that contrary-to-duty scenarios give rise to deontic dilemmas and provide counterexamples to the transmission principle, according to which we ought to take the necessary means to actions we ought to perform. In an earlier article, I have argued, contrary to actualism, that the notion of 'ought' that figures in conclusions of practical deliberation does not allow for deontic dilemmas and validates the transmission principle. Here I defend these claims, together with my possibilist account of contrary-to-duty scenarios, against Stephen White's recent criticism. Suppose that you ought to see your doctor and a necessary means to doing this is to take a day off work. A natural conclusion to draw is that you ought to take a day off work. This, at any rate, follows from an intuitive principle that plays an important role in a number of philosophical theories and arguments: The transmission principle: If A ought to f, and y-ing is a necessary means for A to f, then A ought to y. 1 But now suppose that if you were to take a day off work, you would not actually go to the doctor. Even though you could go to the doctor, you would in fact stay home, feel anxious and get no work done. You might now side with John Broome, who offers this example, and others who present similar such "contrary-to-duty scenarios", as I shall call them, in thinking that it is no longer plausible to assume that you ought to take the necessary means. 2 What is 1 See Kiesewetter (2015, 922) for references and examples of such theories. 2 See Broome (2013, 126). By a "contrary-to-duty" scenario, I mean to refer to a scenario in which an agent is failing, or will fail, to do what she ought to do. Even though strictly speaking not all 'oughts' amount to duties or obligations, I shall allow myself in this article to use the terms 'obligation' and 'duty' to refer to 'oughts' for the sake of convenience. The term 'contrary-to-duty scenario' draws on Chisholm (1963), who proposes a number of such cases himself. The most widely discussed contrary-to-duty scenario is presumably the example of Professor Procrastinate offered by Jackson and Pargetter (1986, 235), which is in turn inspired by Goldman the point of taking a day off if you would not in fact use it for going to the doctor (or for doing anything else you have reason to do)? Indeed, upon closer consideration you might even think that you ought to not take a day off in your circumstances. For given that you will not actually see your doctor, not taking a day off is better for you than taking a day off. However, if you deny that you ought to take the day off in this scenario, then you are thereby committed to rejecting the transmission principle. And if you maintain that you ought to not take a day off, then you are thereby committed to rejecting another principle that seems rather plausible: Joint satisfiability: If A ought to f and A ought to y, then A can [f and y]. This is because, if taking a day off is a necessary means to seeing your doctor, then you cannot both see your doctor an...

Conflicting Judgments and Weakness of Will

“…Moreover, we can still say that, whatever label we may use for this phenomenon, it is irrational to not intend to do what you judge you ought to do (Broome 2013;Fink 2013, special issue on Enkrasia). It follows that, if an agent is in a dilemma, she seems to be necessarily irrational in this way (Kiesewetter 2018). One might wish to react to this challenge in a way similar to one of the reactions to the puzzle presented here.…”

On believing indirectly for practical reasons

“…A consideration R is a reason for you to u only if R can motivate at least one of your responses (i.e., you can u for R, or try to u for R, or intend to u for R, or desire to u for R, etc. ).Footnote 33 continued reasons for aims transmit to necessary means for that aim (as defended extensively byKiesewetter, 2015Kiesewetter, , 2018, any state-reason will imply a reason to bring the state about, or to maintain it. Even though I do not need to rely on a principle of necessary means transmission if I assume MC, this line of argument still seems worth mentioning, for it provides a basis for defending SRRA without assuming MC.On believing indirectly for practical reasons…”

Supererogation and conditional obligation

“…PE(A) iff :OB(:A). This rules out dilemmas, but dilemmas are not our topic here (for discussion of contrary-to-duty scenarios and deontic dilemmas, see Kiesewetter 2018). Note also that on a dyadic interpretation of conditional obligations, the inference from 'OB(A or B)' to 'OB(A/:B)' is invalid (Pummer 2019, p. 286).…”