1987
DOI: 10.1016/0029-5493(87)90088-4
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Contributions from the ACRR in-pile experiments to the understanding of key phenomena influencing unprotected loss of flow accident simulations in LMFBRs

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Condition (4) rules out instantaneous explosive vaporization upon contact, 6) Condition (5) rules out sodium reentry, 13) and Condition (6) eliminates significant coolant entrapment as the fuel displaces the coolant. 14) These general characteristics are consistent with experimental observations [10][11][12][13] and are especially important in ruling out energetic recriticality events, i.e., eliminating the potential for reaching super prompt critical conditions from fuel compaction mechanisms driven by fuel coolant interactions between dispersed fuel and liquid sodium near the top and bottom of the active core. Condition (7) prevents significant in-core direct fuel coolant contact, i.e., the fuel and the coolant within the core is largely separated by solid cladding.…”
Section: Subassembly Blockage Potentialsupporting
confidence: 71%
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“…Condition (4) rules out instantaneous explosive vaporization upon contact, 6) Condition (5) rules out sodium reentry, 13) and Condition (6) eliminates significant coolant entrapment as the fuel displaces the coolant. 14) These general characteristics are consistent with experimental observations [10][11][12][13] and are especially important in ruling out energetic recriticality events, i.e., eliminating the potential for reaching super prompt critical conditions from fuel compaction mechanisms driven by fuel coolant interactions between dispersed fuel and liquid sodium near the top and bottom of the active core. Condition (7) prevents significant in-core direct fuel coolant contact, i.e., the fuel and the coolant within the core is largely separated by solid cladding.…”
Section: Subassembly Blockage Potentialsupporting
confidence: 71%
“…9) Posttest examinations of numerous inpile fuel disruption tests for both fresh fuel and pre-irradiated fuel have shown extensive mixing of solidified steel within solidified fuel remains. [10][11][12] The general character of the fuel remains from all the loss-of-flow simulation tests resembles that of a porous mass of fuel with fairly large voids and with considerable entrainment of globules of steel. The resulting vaporization of entrapped steel drove fuel debris to the ends of the fuel region, i.e.…”
Section: The Role and Application Of General Behavior Princeiplesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Pulse width is a critical parameter as it affects the timing of pellet-to-cladding heat transfer, and the resulting temperature-dependent mechanical properties, along with affecting strain rates during the mechanical interaction. Recent simulations suggest that peak cladding hoop stress can be more than doubled in a pulse 30 ms versus a slightly wider pulse 90 ms FWHM (Folsom, et al, 2016 (Cabrillat, et al, 2003), Japanese Nuclear Safety Research Reactor (NSRR) (Fuketa, et al, 2006), the United States (US) Annual Core Research Reactor (ACRR) (Royl, et al, 1987), Impulse Graphite Reactor (IGR) in Kazakhstan (Payot, et al, 2017), and the US Power Burst Facility (PBF) (Petti, et al, 1994 and forthcoming LWRenvironment capsules/loops for TREAT (Woolstenhulme, et al, 2016b). While CABRI's innate FWHM is approximately 10 ms, it can be "stretched" by continuing to insert reactivity after the initial step-up to achieve 20 -80 ms (Clamens, et al, 2016).…”
Section: Transient Testing To Support Lwr Accident Simulationsmentioning
confidence: 99%