2014
DOI: 10.1525/as.2014.54.4.801
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Controlling Cyberspace in Malaysia

Abstract: A BSTRACTThis paper examines how Internet control strategy in Malaysia was shaped by particular forms of online political contention and by a well-coordinated online civil society. It also traces the shift of this strategy to more covert means in the 2011 Sarawak State election.Malaysia is increasingly referred to as a positive example when political scientists (re)emphasize the democratic powers of the Internet. 1 To a large extent, the historical elections in 2008 substantiated this argument. The stunning ou… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
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“…To explain why, I use the example of the regime's failure to 'manage' the corruption scandal involving former PM Najib Razak. When the corruption scandal broke in 2015, the Malaysian regime was doing everything it could to control cyberspace: it paid cyber-troopers (Yangyue, 2014), used Italian surveillance software (Marczak et al, 2014), bought off online commentators (Hopkins, 2014), punished online dissidents that could not be co-opted (Open Net Initiative, 2017), and used DDoS attacks against critical online platforms (Freedom House, 2017). The regime also blocked access to the portals covering the scandal once the story was published (Human Rights Watch Report, 2016).…”
Section: Qualitative Evidencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…To explain why, I use the example of the regime's failure to 'manage' the corruption scandal involving former PM Najib Razak. When the corruption scandal broke in 2015, the Malaysian regime was doing everything it could to control cyberspace: it paid cyber-troopers (Yangyue, 2014), used Italian surveillance software (Marczak et al, 2014), bought off online commentators (Hopkins, 2014), punished online dissidents that could not be co-opted (Open Net Initiative, 2017), and used DDoS attacks against critical online platforms (Freedom House, 2017). The regime also blocked access to the portals covering the scandal once the story was published (Human Rights Watch Report, 2016).…”
Section: Qualitative Evidencementioning
confidence: 99%