Controlling the key by choosing the detection bits in quantum cryptographic protocols

Abstract

Eavesdropping detection is an indispensable process of most quantum cryptographic protocols. By publishing and comparing part of the shared bits, called as detection bits, the participants can check whether there exists an eavesdropper. Generally, the detection bits are chosen randomly. Consequently, the secret bits, i.e., the rest bits, are also random. Then, what if the detection bits are chosen non-randomly? Can the participant who chooses the detection bits make the secret bits to be a predetermined string he expected? This paper focuses on the participants' key control capability when they choose the detection bits selectively in two-party quantum communication protocols. Concretely, we analyze the participants' key control capability in different situations of different proportions of the detection bits. And we prove that the participants can predetermine, with high probability, any part of the secret bits of which the length is smaller than that of the detection bits. The above result has various potential applications in quantum cryptographic protocols. Obviously, utilizing this non-random selection of the detection bits, one can realize the function of a deterministic quantum key distribution protocol through a random one if the number of the detection bits is not smaller than that of the secret bits. What is more, we find that quite a few quantum key agreement protocols cannot guarantee the fairness of the key in the sense that the participant who chooses the detection bits can control the key somewhat.Keywords eavesdropping detection, deterministic quantum key distribution, quantum key agreement, quantum information, quantum cryptography CitationLiu B, Gao F, Huang W, et al. Controlling the key by choosing the detection bits in quantum cryptographic protocols.

3D textured model encryption via 3D Lu chaotic mapping

“…The inherent properties connect it directly with cryptographic characteristics of confusion and diffusion, which is presented in Shannon's works [15]. High-dimensional chaotic system is more reliable to design secure image encryption scheme because of its high complexity [6,11,12,5,13].…”

“…The inherent properties connect it directly with cryptographic characteristics of confusion and diffusion, which is presented in Shannon's works [15]. High-dimensional chaotic system is more reliable to design secure image encryption scheme because of its high complexity [6,11,12,5,13]. Some cryptosystems, which are based on a low-dimensional chaotic map, have obvious drawbacks, such as short period and small key space [23].…”

Collusive attacks to “circle-type” multi-party quantum key agreement protocols

“…collusive attacks? [35] CGT Yes Yes [36] CGT Yes Yes [37] CGT Yes Yes [38] TT CT Yes No [47], if the number of dishonest participants' detect bits is larger than that of the final key, they can always totally predetermine the key. Is it possible to design a fair CT-MQKA protocol?…”

“…[38] is called the tree-type MQKA. In fact, the tree-type QKA protocol is sensitive to a special attack called detection bits chosen attack [47] which we will briefly introduce in conclusions.…”