Conventionalism about what? Where Duhem and Poincaré part ways

Abstract

This paper examines whether, and in what contexts, Duhem's and Poincaré's views can be regarded as conventionalist or structural realist. After analysing the three different contexts in which conventionalism is attributed to them -in the context of the aim of science, the underdetermination problem and the epistemological status of certain principles -I show that neither Duhem's nor Poincaré's arguments can be regarded as conventionalist. I argue that Duhem and Poincaré offer different solutions to the problem of theory choice, differ in their stances towards scientific knowledge and the status of scientific principles, making their epistemological claims substantially different.

Duhem and Holism

“…Duhem's language is rather weak, arguing that when a theory makes unexpected predictions or unifications, we 'feel' or 'suspect' our theory reflects worldly order, and often his language even sounds like a warning rather than a statement of confidence, when he tells us we 'apprehend' that the theory is indeed a natural classification. Whether we should read this as an argument for fallibilism and an expression of caution about committing to the theory's success, or whether this is simply an admission that realism is only justifiable as a motivation rather than a stance towards our theories, is a matter of dispute (Ivanova (2010(Ivanova ( , 2015.…”

Scienza Per Convenzione?

“…Per un approfondimento sulle differenze tra il convenzionalismo di Poincaré e di Duhem si veda Ref. [8].…”

¿Son las teorías científicas estructuras, instrumentos o realidad?

“…Los principales desafíos del realismo científico radican en el antirrealismo y el instrumentalismo. El antirrealismo sugiere que las teorías científicas no deberían buscar ninguna ontología subyacente más allá de lo observable, el éxito explicativo y predictivo de las teorías solo atestigua la utilidad de sus postulados, y no puede garantizar la creencia en que las entidades postuladas son reales (Ivanova, 2015). Así, términos teóricos como "electrones" y "genes" deberían eliminarse de las teorías.…”