Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence

Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Ehrhart, Karl‐Martin; Keser, Claudia

doi:10.1006/game.2001.0897

Cited by 69 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…As coordination seems to be so difficult in this setting, how can we describe learning processes that lead to coordinated behavior in networks and how do they relate to specific structural features? A second extension could be to experimentally explicitly focus on the effect of incomplete information in the local public good framework, as a test of Galeotti et al (2006) and a follow-up on Berninghaus' et al ( , 2002 finding that structure has an effect even if individuals are not informed about it. Finally, also in the framework of local public goods, a dynamic analysis that includes strategic linking between agents could investigate the coevolution of behavior and network structure.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Berninghaus et al (1998Berninghaus et al ( , 2002 present the first experiments that consider the role of the global structure of networks in coordination games. In their experiment, agents are located on a circle, and on a two-dimensional lattice, and while the size of an agent's neighborhood remains constant across treatments, the neighborhood structure differs.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis

Rosenkranz

Weitzel

2012

Games and Economic Behavior

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This paper analyzes the effects of network positions and individual risk attitudes on individuals' strategic decisions in an experiment where actions are strategic substitutes. The game theoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007). In particular, we are interested in disentangling the influence of global, local and individual factors. We study subjects' strategic investment decisions in four basic network structures. As predicted, we find that global factors, such as the regularity of the network structure, influence behavior. However, we also find evidence that individual play in networks is to some extent boundedly rational, in the sense that coordination is influenced by local and individual factors, such as the number of (direct) neighbors, local clustering and individuals' risk attitudes.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis

Rosenkranz

Weitzel

2012

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…For instance, based on vast research data, Cooper found that it was easier to reach "coordination failure" so that the risk-dominant equilibrium was selected more in a repeated double Stag-Hunt game with numerous equilibrium [4]. Berninghaus suggested that a local reaction under various constructions of group double Stag-Hunt game would influence the eventual equilibrium in his paper [5]. An illustrative work by Camerer indicated that "coordination failure" would be certain to arise when the size of agents was out of range in a group coordination game regardless of whether external disturbance generated [6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the other hand, some social science scholars thought that the features of environment and construction of agents played an important role in the eventual equilibrium selections in an evolutionary perspective [7]. Such as Berninghaus demonstrated that local interactions had an effect on the result in weakest-link games [10]. What's more, Keser's comparative experiment between cyclic construction with mutual reactions and general weakest-link game in which three players chose two strategies suggested that a cyclic structure with mutual reactions would improve the Pareto Optimality [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Evolution Model of Multiplayers Stag-Hunt Game in a Cycle Network

Jiao¹,

Ya²

2017

dtssehs

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Abstract. Social contracts and norms can be defined as the selection of Nash-equilibrium in coordination game. However, existing studies on group coordination game are lack of a theoretical process which simulates the evolution of behaviors of agents, especially in a cycle network. In this paper, by means of establishing Cellular Automata Model (CAM) based on the Stag Hunt Game as the bottom model in cycle network, we simulate the dynamically evolutionary Group Stag-Hunt Game in which assumed that an individual has complete rationality. The conclusion suggested that the final results were related to the size of the payoff factor and the risk factor and the structure features of the network. This model provides dynamically evolutionary Group Stag Hunt Game researches in a cycle network with a theoretical support.

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“…Berninghaus, Ehrhart and Keser (2002) extend the design of Keser et alii (1998) to a more general framework, in order to gain more insight on the impact of neighborhood sizes and structures on equilibrium selection. Specifically, they add a network of 16 players arranged in a lattice with four neighbors each and a network of 16 players arranged in a circle, each linked to the four closest players.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental Games on Networks: Underpinnings of Behavior and Equilibrium Selection

et al. 2014

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Abstract. In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a more general network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since economic environments typically have a considerable degree of complementarity or substitutability, this framework applies to a wide variety of settings. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, in particular with incomplete information. Behavior closely resembles the theoretical equilibrium whenever this is unique; when there are multiple equilibria, general features of networks, such as connectivity, clustering, and the degree of the players, help to predict informed behavior in the lab. People appear to be strongly attracted to maximizing aggregate payoffs (social efficiency), but there are forces that moderate this attraction: 1) people seem content with (in the aggregate) capturing only the lion's share of the efficient profits in exchange for reduced exposure to loss, and 2) uncertainty about the network structure makes it considerably more difficult to coordinate on a demanding, but efficient, equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information. JEL Codes: C71, C91, D03, D85

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Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence

Cited by 69 publications

References 26 publications

Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis

Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis

A Dynamic Evolution Model of Multiplayers Stag-Hunt Game in a Cycle Network

Experimental Games on Networks: Underpinnings of Behavior and Equilibrium Selection

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