Conventions in the<i>Aufbau</i>

Uebel, Thomas

doi:10.1080/09608789608570947

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 14 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Doing so requires that the protocols and the sentences of science be couched in the same language. For otherwise there can be no inferential relations between them, and so no derivation of the protocols from scientific theory that are needed for the theory 68 See Friedman 1987, Friedman 1991, Uebel 1996a, Uebel 1996b, Seibt 1997, Richardson 1990, and Richardson 1998. See Hamilton 1992 for a characterization of the Aufbau as a work "in transition" embodying Carnap's "final expression of empiricocritical positivism" as well as "the beginnings of the linguistic relativism famously expressed as the Principle of Tolerance" that Friedman et alemphasize.…”

Section: Carnap and The Empiricist Criterion Of Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

The Received View

Matthews¹

2007

The Measure of Mind

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This chapter begins with a discussion of the eight basic tenets of the Received View, which taken together firstly present reductive metaphysical claims about the nature of propositional attitudes, cognitive capacities, and cognition itself; and secondly a normative epistemological claim about the proper form of cognitive psychological explanations. What is distinctive and essential to the Received View, and serves to distinguish it from superficially similar views about how cognition is to be understood and explained, is the representational-computational construal of propositional attitudes and their role in cognition presented in tenets (v)-(vii) of the view. The three important entailments of the received view and the historical origins and development of the Received View are considered.

show abstract

Section: Carnap and The Empiricist Criterion Of Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

The Received View

Matthews¹

2007

The Measure of Mind

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Section: Carnap and The Empiricist Criterion Of Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

Stroud's Camap

Alspector-Kelly

2002

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" Carnap drew his famous distinction between 'internal' and 'external' questions of existence, pronouncing the former meaningful and the latter meaningless. In The Significance of Philosophicul Scepticism, Barry Stmud understands Carnap to be applying the verification criterion of meaningfulness in order to refute Cartesian skepticism. I suggest that Stroud misrepresents both Carnap's aim and method. Camap was responding to critics who suggested that his willingness to quantify over abstract entities in his work in semantics violated his commitment to empiricism. He rejected that criticism as presupposing a super-scientific standpoint from which constraints on the admissible domain of entities of science could be delivered. Carnap wanted to insulate science from the imposition of first-philosophical metaphysical prejudice, not to defuse scepticism by appeal to verificationism. 42 43 Carnap 1950/56, p. 207.

show abstract

“…6 It is perhaps important to emphasize that, as formulated here, foundationalism is a pure type. It does not even correspond to the position of the Vienna Circle positivists (see Uebel, 1996). 7 See Suppe (1954) for an account of the collapse of what he calls ʽthe received viewʼ and the arguments involved.…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

Bias in Social Research

Hammersley¹,

Gomm²

1997

Sociological Research Online

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Accusations of bias are not uncommon in the social sciences. However, the term ‘bias’ is by no means straightforward in meaning. One problem is that it is ambiguous. Sometimes, it is used to refer to the adoption of a particular perspective from which some things become salient and others merge into the background. More commonly, ‘bias’ refers to systematic error: deviation from a true score, the latter referring to the valid measurement of some phenomenon or to accurate estimation of a population parameter. The term may also be used in a more specific sense, to denote one particular source of systematic error: that deriving from a conscious or unconscious tendency on the part of a researcher to produce data, and/or to interpret them, in a way that inclines towards erroneous conclusions which are in line with his or her commitments. In either form, the use of ‘bias’ to refer to systematic error is problematic. It depends on other concepts, such as ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’, whose justification and role have been questioned. In particular, it seems to rely on foundationalist epistemological assumptions that have been discredited. And the various radical epistemological positions that some social scientists have adopted as an alternative either deny the validity of this concept of bias, explicitly or implicitly, or transform it entirely. We will argue, however, that while it is true that abandonment of a foundationalist conception of science has important implications for the meaning of ‘bias’ and its associated concepts, they are defensible; indeed, they form an essential framework for research as a social practice. In this context, we shall examine error as a matter of collegial accountability, and define ‘bias’ as one of several potential forms of error. We conclude by pointing to what we see as the growing threat of bias in the present state of social research.

show abstract

Conventions in theAufbau

Cited by 4 publications

References 14 publications

The Received View

The Received View

Stroud's Camap

Bias in Social Research

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About