2018
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-95141-6_4
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Conventions of Unamendability: Covert Constitutional Unamendability in (Two) Politically Enforced Constitutions

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Cited by 18 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…This is consistent with an approach that has been called 'covert unamendability', in which judiciaries in systems with strongly-positioned legislatures employ judicial creativity and 'disobedience' when necessary to mitigate the effect of certain purported constitutional alterations, as though there exists 'a particular convention that the legislature will not abolish or significantly alter a given constitutional arrangement'. 201 In Semenyih Jaya, the Federal Court certainly did an excellent job of invoking numerous core principles, stressing inter alia that the Judiciary is entrusted with keeping every organ of the state within its legal boundary; and that judicial power, judicial independence and the separation of powers are critical and sacrosanct within the constitutional framework. 202 Although I have highlighted above the inherent risks of this particular approach, if it ultimately succeeds, this could carry new implications for our understanding of the 'basic structure doctrine' and the means by which the objectives of the doctrine can be achieved.…”
Section: A Uniquely Moderate Approach?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is consistent with an approach that has been called 'covert unamendability', in which judiciaries in systems with strongly-positioned legislatures employ judicial creativity and 'disobedience' when necessary to mitigate the effect of certain purported constitutional alterations, as though there exists 'a particular convention that the legislature will not abolish or significantly alter a given constitutional arrangement'. 201 In Semenyih Jaya, the Federal Court certainly did an excellent job of invoking numerous core principles, stressing inter alia that the Judiciary is entrusted with keeping every organ of the state within its legal boundary; and that judicial power, judicial independence and the separation of powers are critical and sacrosanct within the constitutional framework. 202 Although I have highlighted above the inherent risks of this particular approach, if it ultimately succeeds, this could carry new implications for our understanding of the 'basic structure doctrine' and the means by which the objectives of the doctrine can be achieved.…”
Section: A Uniquely Moderate Approach?mentioning
confidence: 99%