Cooperation against Theft: A Test of Incentives for Water Management in Tunisia

Mattoussi, Wided; Seabright, Paul

doi:10.1093/ajae/aat083

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…10 Since q cs ≥ q fi , then (C2) is only binding if (C1) is also binding, and so we can ignore (C2). 11 Which is set by the Ministry of Agriculture.…”

Section: First Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

On the Design of Total Water Use-Based Incentive Schemes for Groundwater Management

Mattoussi¹,

Matoussi²,

Mattoussi³

2022

Water Conservation - Inevitable Strategy

Self Cite

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Groundwater over-pumping by manipulating water meters may constraint the efficient use of the resource, leading to the potential aquifers’ deterioration. Well designed institutional arrangements might be effective at reducing over-exploitation. The objective of this research was to shed light on the design of various incentive schemes to face groundwater over-pumping ranging from individual water use-based incentive schemes, where individual withdrawals are the users’ private information, to total water use-based incentive schemes, where the aggregate withdrawal is publicly observable. For the latter setting, two schemes were proposed. The first one is within the framework of moral hazard in teams, where the Water Authority administers monetary incentives that do not balance the budget, restoring thereby the full-information outcome. The second scheme promotes a cooperative management governed by a collective responsibility rule that induces peer monitoring by members. We show that groundwater overuse is more likely when monitoring costs are high, punishments are weak and cooperatives are large. We also show how the cooperative size and punishments are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring. We extend the basic analysis to study collusion in monitoring between cooperative members and compare different monitoring structures. The results confirm that well-designed incentives and institutions can reduce groundwater over-exploitation, and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design.

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“…10 Since q cs ≥ q fi , then (C2) is only binding if (C1) is also binding, and so we can ignore (C2). 11 Which is set by the Ministry of Agriculture.…”

Section: First Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Water institutions can be effective at improving the resource allocation whenever they are well designed. Institutions influence individual behavior through incentives they give rise to, but institutions themselves evolve endogenously in part because of their incentive properties [11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Design of Total Water Use-Based Incentive Schemes for Groundwater Management

Mattoussi¹,

Matoussi²,

Mattoussi³

2022

Water Conservation - Inevitable Strategy

Self Cite

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“…Evidence of the effects of these factors on utility revenues has been found for several places such as Kampala, Uganda (Mutikanga et al 2011), Tunisia (Mattoussi and Seabright, 2014), and Nairobi Furthermore, utilities could perform communal contributions, inform about the actions undertaken by the utilities to increase institutional trust and potentially modify consumer behavior in these realms.…”

Section: Behavioral Insights On Non-price Measures and Consumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Behavioral Insights in Infrastructure Sectors: A Survey

Joseph¹,

Ayling²,

Miquel-Florensa³

et al. 2021

Policy Research Working Papers

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The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

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“…Improving agricultural technology and increasing costs for monitoring have a positive impact in reducing water theft in Tunisia. (Mattoussi & Seabright, 2014).…”

Section: Factors That Cause Groundwater Taxation On Dewatering Are Not Optimal In Dki Jakarta Provincementioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of the Implementation of Groundwater Tax on Dewatering in Jakarta

Agustina

Inayati

2020

JAP

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This article aims to analyze the implementation of groundwater tax on dewatering in DKI Jakarta Province and the factors causing the collection of groundwater tax on dewatering are not optimal in DKI Jakarta Province. The problem is focused on the ground water tax policy on dewatering in DKI Jakarta Province. To approach this problem, the theory of Merilee Grindle's about policy implementation was used. Data were collected through literature study and field study and analyzed qualitatively. Through this method, data and information obtained from field studies and literature studies were then processed to draw conclusions. This study concludes that there are interests that are affected in the implementation of groundwater tax on dewatering, especially the interests of the Regional Tax and Retribution Agency. It is related to the desired benefits of implementing the policy, namely increasing groundwater tax revenues in DKI Jakarta Province. Some factors caused the implementation of ground water tax on dewatering were not optimal are human resources that are still lacking in terms of quality and quantity, data collection and supervision have not been done well, lack of coordination between related agencies, lack of socialization and unclear implementation regulations

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Cooperation against Theft: A Test of Incentives for Water Management in Tunisia

Cited by 9 publications

References 37 publications

On the Design of Total Water Use-Based Incentive Schemes for Groundwater Management

On the Design of Total Water Use-Based Incentive Schemes for Groundwater Management

Behavioral Insights in Infrastructure Sectors: A Survey

Analysis of the Implementation of Groundwater Tax on Dewatering in Jakarta

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