Cooperation between counterparts in parliament from an agenda-setting perspective: legislative coalitions as a trade of criticism and policy

Christiansen, Flemming; Seeberg, Henrik Bech

doi:10.1080/01402382.2016.1157744

Cited by 14 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…This is why we rely on an emerging perspective on issue emphasis in parliamentary speaking (Chaqués-Bonafont, Palau, and Baumgartner 2014). Recent research compellingly shows that parliamentary questions and answers are a good proxy for party issue attention and are highly correlated with other communication sources like the media (Christiansen and Seeberg 2016). This suggests that parliamentary speaking is not simply a mechanical or strategic set of interactions different from messages targeted to public opinion.…”

Section: Issue Competition In Parliamentary Speakingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Responsiveness and the Political Conditioning of the Electoral Cycle

Pardos‐Prado

Sagarzazu²

2019

The Journal of Politics

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Section: Issue Competition In Parliamentary Speakingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic Responsiveness and the Political Conditioning of the Electoral Cycle

Pardos‐Prado

Sagarzazu²

2019

The Journal of Politics

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“…The relative privacy of pre-legislative negotiations makes it possible for minority cabinets to make concessions without appearing weak and ineffective. Ensuring support for bills prior to introduction may serve to lower the scale of criticism that opposition parties advance against government initiatives once they have been introduced (see Christiansen and Seeberg, 2016). Minority cabinets are also likely to want to minimize the risk of suffering voting defeats on their own initiatives because such defeats would place a question mark over their mandate to govern.…”

Section: Explaining Legislative Reliabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Minority governments and legislative reliability

Klüver

Zubek

2017

Party Politics

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When are minority cabinets effective? We study the extent to which minority cabinets demonstrate legislative reliability, that is, introduce to parliament the bills they have announced in their legislative agendas. We test hypotheses drawn from two theories of minority government effectiveness: the positional agenda power theory which emphasizes the central location of the minority cabinet in the policy space and the ideological proximity theory which stresses the importance of the ideological closeness of opposition parties to the government. In an analysis of over 1600 bills announced by Danish and Swedish minority cabinets in 19 legislative agendas published between 1998 and 2012, we find more support, overall, for the ideological proximity than for the positional agenda power model.

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“…The reason for this possible dilemma lies in the fact that although support parties are not formally in government and less likely to be held responsible (Thesen et al 2017), their greater cooperation with the minority government may lead to a loss of distinctiveness from the government party. Opposition parties worry about being perceived as too close to the minority government when being part of a legislative agreement (Christiansen & Seeberg 2016). Support parties in their legislative behaviour may, therefore, also be constrained by an imperative to keep a certain distance from the government.…”

Section: Theoretical Assumptions and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the one hand, support parties are often essential to the stability of a minority government (Christiansen & Pedersen 2014), which lends those opposition parties considerable bargaining power (Bale & Bergman 2006b, 440). On the other hand, they are more independent from the government as they do not share in the rewards of ministries or cabinet seats and are less likely to be associated with government policy outputs (Bale & Dann 2002; Christiansen & Seeberg 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Timing in Opposition Party Support under Minority Government

Müller

König

2021

Scand Pol Stud

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Opposition parties under minority governments find themselves in a fundamental dilemma. They are competing with other parties, including the government, for electoral support while also having a common responsibility to make stable government work. This dilemma is especially pronounced for opposition parties signing support agreements with the government. While not formally in a coalition, they nonetheless publicly commit to supporting a government. They may thus be concerned about losing distinctiveness and have an interest in strategically timing cooperation with the minority government. The present paper tests whether this is the case using data on opposition party voting on committee proposals from 23 years of Swedish minority governments between 1991 and 2018. The findings indicate that support parties are less likely to support the government towards the beginning and end of the election cycle, that is, when public attention is intense -a pattern that is not observable for other opposition parties.

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Cooperation between counterparts in parliament from an agenda-setting perspective: legislative coalitions as a trade of criticism and policy

Cited by 14 publications

References 42 publications

Economic Responsiveness and the Political Conditioning of the Electoral Cycle

Economic Responsiveness and the Political Conditioning of the Electoral Cycle

Minority governments and legislative reliability

Timing in Opposition Party Support under Minority Government

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