2021
DOI: 10.1140/epjb/s10051-021-00239-z
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Cooperation evolves by the payoff-difference-based probabilistic reward

Abstract: In the previous studies, the author proposes the payoff-difference-based probabilistic peer-punishment that the probability of punishing a defector increases as the difference of payoff between a player and a defector increases and shows that the proposed peer-punishment effectively increases the number of cooperators and the average payoff of all players. On the other hand, reward as well as punishment is considered to be a mechanism promoting cooperation, and many studies have discussed the effect of reward … Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…The literature on cooperation explores various mechanisms that do not rely on punishment. These include cognitive factors such as intuition and deliberation 48 50 , as well as psychological factors, such as imitation of emotions 51 , 52 , positive interactions 53 , 54 , and rewards 55 58 . Other mechanisms include the coevolution of norms 59 , 60 , the coevolution of costs and benefits 61 , and opting out from the public good game altogether 62 64 .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The literature on cooperation explores various mechanisms that do not rely on punishment. These include cognitive factors such as intuition and deliberation 48 50 , as well as psychological factors, such as imitation of emotions 51 , 52 , positive interactions 53 , 54 , and rewards 55 58 . Other mechanisms include the coevolution of norms 59 , 60 , the coevolution of costs and benefits 61 , and opting out from the public good game altogether 62 64 .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A few works have considered minimizing the cost of incentive enforcement from the perspective of optimization, and managed to design cost-effective reward or punishment [38][39][40][41][42] for an external third-party (or external decision-maker [26]). In these studies, the third party is composed of agents that do not belong to the system, and the income of such an external third party was not considered.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%