Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism

Hirshleifer, David; Rasmusen, Eric Bennett

doi:10.1016/0167-2681(89)90078-4

Cited by 308 publications

(107 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…In conclusion, because we allow the realistic assumption of uncertainty about the life duration of the organization (or the number of repetitions of the game), our results differ from the results obtained by Hirshleifer and Rasmussen (1989). First, if the probability that the organization will not end is positive, cooperation is possible over an infinite number of periods.…”

Section: Equilibriumcontrasting

confidence: 82%

Short-Run vs. Long-Run Cooperation Among the G-20 Countries

Mundaca

2011

SSRN Journal

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In a model of repeated games, we determine the conditions under which cooperation is an equilibrium outcome among the G-20 countries. We consider first, that members are uncertain about the lifespan of the G-20. Second, the nature of member countries and their interrelations can change because of shifts in government regimes. Monitoring and peer pressure to comply with the agreements made are necessary if the goals are to achieve cooperation and thereby attain desirable common goals. If member countries are prone to shifting government regimes and governments are not concerned about their countries' reputations, continuous cooperation becomes more difficult.

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Section: Equilibriumcontrasting

confidence: 82%

Short-Run vs. Long-Run Cooperation Among the G-20 Countries

Mundaca

2011

SSRN Journal

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“…Models in economics (Hirshleifer & Rasmusen 1989) and evolutionary biology (Boyd & Richerson 1992) indicate that evolution can favour a single punisher per social group and that the actions of this one punisher can efficiently galvanize group cooperation. This solution is particularly interesting since it lacks the second-order free rider problem-which has been the central focus of much theoretical effort-and it avoids the problem of uncoordinated over punishment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation

2008

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Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an alternative theoretical proposal: responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadership in human groups and provides further evidence supporting that humans will readily and knowingly behave altruistically.

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“…Elles peuvent être non monétaires et reposer sur la désapprobation sociale et le sentiment de honte ou un sentiment de culpabilité dès lors que le regard des pairs est internalisé [Kandel et Lazear 1992]. Une autre forme de sanction est l'ostracisme, qui consiste à exclure du groupe un membre déviant [Hirshleifer et Rasmusen 1989]. Les sanctions peuvent aussi être de nature monétaire et consister à ce que l'agent déviant ne reçoive pas la totalité de la part de l'output qui lui est due ; Dong et Dow 1993] ou qu'il fasse l'objet d'actions de sabotage de la part de ses pairs (Lazear 1989).…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Les conditions d’efficacite de la pression par les pairs, ou comment faire respecter les normes sociales au sein des organisations

Masclet

2016

SOEP

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Résumé : Cet article vise à étudier les conditions d'effi cacité de la pression des pairs comme mécanisme permettant de réduire les comportements de passager clandestin au sein des groupes. La comparaison des modèles avec et sans pression des pairs montre que sous certaines conditions le contrôle mutuel peut inciter les agents à fournir davantage d'eff ort de production. Il existe toutefois des limites à la pression des pairs : (1) le contrôle mutuel peut s'avérer coûteux pour le groupe dès lors que les eff orts de production et de contrôle sont fortement substituables ; (2) la menace de sanction n'est pas crédible lorsque sanctionner devient coûteux pour le punisseur (coût d'opportunité, risque de représailles, etc.). Nous montrons toutefois que lorsque les individus sont suffi samment averses à l'inégalité, ils peuvent être incités à sanctionner leurs pairs même en présence d'un cout à sanctionner.Mots Clé : pression par les pairs, normes sociales, contrôle mutuel. JEL Classifi cation : D7, J33, J5. TERMS OF EFFICIENCY PEER PRESSURE OR HOW TO RESPECT THE STANDARDS IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONSAbstract: Th e purpose of this paper is to investigate the conditions under which peer pressure helps in deterring the free riding problem. Th e comparison of situations with and without peer pressure indicates that under certain conditions peer pressure may 164David Masclet solve the well-known free riding problem. However there are several limitations to peer pressure including (1) the fact that peer monitoring is costly when production and monitoring eff orts are substituted; (2) the threat of sanctions is not credible when sanctions are costly to implement. Nevertheless, strongly inequality averse individuals may still be encouraged to punish free riders despite the existence of a cost to -in the punishment of free riders.

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Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism

Cited by 308 publications

References 10 publications

Short-Run vs. Long-Run Cooperation Among the G-20 Countries

Short-Run vs. Long-Run Cooperation Among the G-20 Countries

Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation

Les conditions d’efficacite de la pression par les pairs, ou comment faire respecter les normes sociales au sein des organisations

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