Animal Communication Networks 2005
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511610363.027
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Cooperation in communication networks: indirect reciprocity in interactions between cleaner fish and client reef fish

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Cited by 23 publications
(26 citation statements)
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“…Thus, large clients that happen to observe such an interaction are deceived by biting cleaners due to a signal out of its typical context (Bshary 2002a): clients rely on false information to invite for inspection and are then cheated. "Biting" individuals were invariably females, and biting was typically documented during the spawning season (Bshary and D'Souza, 2005).…”
Section: Accepted M Manuscriptmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, large clients that happen to observe such an interaction are deceived by biting cleaners due to a signal out of its typical context (Bshary 2002a): clients rely on false information to invite for inspection and are then cheated. "Biting" individuals were invariably females, and biting was typically documented during the spawning season (Bshary and D'Souza, 2005).…”
Section: Accepted M Manuscriptmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Apparently, the current behaviour of the cleaner predicts to a certain extent how cooperative the following interaction will be, therefore eavesdropping on the interactions of others appears to contain reliable information for clients (Covas et al, 2007). Cleaners, in turn, can make use of an eavesdropping audience to signal their (short term) quality as cleaner (Bshary and Würth, 2001;Bshary, 2002;Bshary and D'Souza, 2004;Bshary and Grutter, 2006). Signal reliability is central for prestige based explanations of cooperative investment and it remains a challenging question to determine under which conditions signal reliability can evolve (see also Covas et al, 2007) so prestige can be an explanation of helping behaviour.…”
Section: Group Augmentation: Can It Results From By-product Mutualism?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It turns out that bystanding clients (social eavesdroppers) keep tabs on the cooperative behaviour of cleaner wrasses, perhaps by tallying jolts or remaining attentive to cleaners who are chased by resident fish retaliating a bite (Bshary & D'Souza 2005). Clients consequently invite the services of cooperative cleaners most often, cleaners with no record less often, and cheaters least often (Bshary 2002;Bshary & D'Souza 2005). Thus, the presence of image scoring clients and their punishment of cheaters drive positive selection on cleaners that cooperate indiscriminately when bystanders are present (figure 2, IV; Bshary & D'Souza 2005) because doing so would ensure the maintenance of a positive image score and an abundance of feeding opportunity.…”
Section: Tit-for-tat and Image Scoring In A Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cleaners will cooperate with small, non-predatory clients (as above) and exploit the image scoring system to lure to the area larger, non-predatory clients whose mucus is more easily obtained (Bshary 2002). It is possible that these apparently deceptive cheaters bite only out of necessity; for instance, perhaps cleaners exploit image scoring only when starved or in poor condition (Bshary & D'Souza 2005 Szalai & Számadó 2009). Most aggressive encounters move through a series of increasingly escalated phases that appear to provide progressively more accurate information about the fighting ability of a signaller to the receiver (Enquist & Leimar 1983).…”
Section: Tit-for-tat and Image Scoring In A Networkmentioning
confidence: 99%
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