Cooperation in local and global groups

Fellner, Gerlinde; Lünser, Gabriele K.

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.02.007

Cited by 38 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Moreover, in our xed-matching condition we nd no signi cant increase in allocations to the global account in treatment FH compared to FL. On the other hand, allocations to the global public good increase signi cantly in the corresponding rematched-groups treatments (Result 3), which is consistent with previous research on the MLPG game using milder forms of group identity (Blackwell and McKee, 2003;Fellner and Lünser, 2008). Taken together, these results indicate that the ndings of the previous studies may not be robust to the form of the group identity manipulation.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 86%

“…Previous studies of the MLPG game typically nd that contributions to the global public good are increasing in the relative return on the global account compared to the local one (Blackwell and McKee, 2003;Fellner and Lünser, 2008;Chakravarty and Fonseca, 2013). However, since the Tullock contest potentially induces a much stronger form of in-and out-group identity than has previously been considered in this literature, this…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 77%

“…Blackwell and McKee (2003) use arbitrary group identity groups are formed randomly and identi ed by color and nd weak evidence for in-group preferences, but only when the average per-capita return to the global public good is no lower than that of the local public good. Fellner and Lünser (2008) study a similar experiment, identifying groups by letters and adding a monitoring mechanism to increase the salience of group identity.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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The effect of conflict history on cooperation within and between groups: Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Beekman

Cheung

Levely

2017

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. We study cooperation within and between groups in the laboratory, comparing treatments in which two groups have previously been (i) in conflict with one another, (ii) in conflict with a different group, or (iii) not previously exposed to conflict. We model conflict using an intergroup Tullock contest, and measure its effects upon cooperation using a multi-level public good game. We demonstrate that conflict increases cooperation within groups, while decreasing cooperation between groups. Moreover, we find that cooperation between groups increases in response to an increase in the efficiency gains from cooperation only when the two groups have not previously interacted.JEL Classification: C92, D64, D74, H41

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 86%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 77%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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The effect of conflict history on cooperation within and between groups: Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Beekman

Cheung

Levely

2017

Journal of Economic Psychology

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“…7 Note that coordination could also be affected by binding budgets, as experimentally highlighted by Seely et al (2005). 8 See also Fellner and Lünser (2008) and Falk et al (2013) for related experimental findings. 9 The authors compare results from a benchmark linear public good game with those observed in a setting with two identical linear public goods associated with the same marginal per capita return used in the benchmark.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 97%

Donor coordination in project funding: Evidence from a threshold public goods experiment

Corazzini

Cotton

Valbonesi

2015

Journal of Public Economics

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“…By design our setup is related to a small body of literature on public goods provision that involves multiple layers of independent contribution decisions (see, e.g., Blackwell and McKee, 2003;Fellner and Lünser, 2014). A key feature that differentiates our study from theirs is that decision makers in multi-level public goods games need to trade off contributions between a local and a global level public good.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Providing Global Public Goods: Electoral Delegation and Cooperation

Kocher

Tan

2014

SSRN Journal

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This paper experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing global public goods shared by several groups. Each group elects a delegate who can freely decide on each group member's contribution (including the contribution of herself) to the global public good. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by the theory -quite to the opposite, other-regarding preferences and a re-election incentives guarantee that delegates assign equal contributions for all group members. Since the source of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of global public goods provision together with other-regarding preferences, we use the term Pinefficiency to describe our finding.

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Cooperation in local and global groups

Cited by 38 publications

References 21 publications

The effect of conflict history on cooperation within and between groups: Evidence from a laboratory experiment

The effect of conflict history on cooperation within and between groups: Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Donor coordination in project funding: Evidence from a threshold public goods experiment

Providing Global Public Goods: Electoral Delegation and Cooperation

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