Cooperation, Punishment, Emergence of Government, and the Tragedy of Authorities

Abstract

Under the conditions prevalent in the late Pleistocene (small huntergatherer groups and frequent inter-group conflicts), coevolution of gene-related behavior and culturally transmitted group-level institutions provides a plausible explanation for the parochial altruistic and reciprocator traits of most modern humans. When, with the agricultural revolution, societies became larger and more complex, the collective nature of the monitoring and punishment of norm violators was no longer effective. This led to the emergence of new institutions of governance and social hierarchies. Likely, the smooth acceptance of the new institutions was possible only because, in the majority of the population, the reciprocator trait had become an internalized norm. However the new ruling class has its own dynamics which in turn may lead to new social crisis. Using a simple model, inspired on previous work by Bowles and Gintis, these effects are studied here.