Cooperation vs. competition in a spatial model

Mai, Chao-Cheng; Peng, Shin‐Kun

doi:10.1016/s0166-0462(99)00007-1

Cited by 57 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…This literature has primarily looked at the role of patents in providing adequate 7 Mai and Peng (1999) use such 'black-box' type of spillovers to study firms' incentives to cluster. incentives to sequential innovators.…”

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confidence: 99%

High-tech clusters, technology spillovers, and trade secret laws

Fosfuri

Rønde

2004

International Journal of Industrial Organization

125

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We analyze firms' incentives to cluster in an industrial district to benefit from reciprocal technology spillovers. A simple model of cumulative innovation is presented, where technology spillovers arise endogenously through labor mobility. It is shown that firms' incentives to cluster are the strongest when the following three conditions are met: (1) the growth potential of an industry is high; (2) competition in the product market is relatively soft; (3) the probability of a single firm to develop an innovation is neither very high nor very low. Trade secret protection based on punitive damages is, except in some extreme cases, beneficial for firms' profits, stimulates clustering, and is not an impediment to technology spillovers.JEL classification: J3; K2; L1; O32; O34

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confidence: 99%

High-tech clusters, technology spillovers, and trade secret laws

Fosfuri

Rønde

2004

International Journal of Industrial Organization

125

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“…5 The equilibrium prices are given as: 1 There are many other papers that discuss central agglomeration without collusion. See de Palma et al (1985), Hamilton et al (1989), Anderson and Neven (1991), and Mai and Peng (1999).…”

Section: Noncooperative Nash Equilibrium In Pricesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms

Matsumura

Matsushima

2011

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…The reader is referred to Long and Soubeyran (1996) as well as to Mai and Peng (1996) for attempts in modeling MIDs based on direct spillovers between firms.…”

Section: We Will Accept This Definition Without Arguing More About Whmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning-by-Doing and the Development of Industrial Districts

Soubeyran

1998

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. July 27, 1998 Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractMarshallian districts are locales that accommodate a large number of small firms producing similar goods to be exported and benefit from the accumulation of knowhow associated with workers residing there. We study the making of such districts by assuming that the cost function of a firm is a decreasing function of the total output produced in the past by the firms established in the locale. The dynamics is described by a sequence of temporary equilibria in which firms equalize profits between locales at each period. Hence changing the spatial distribution of firms affects the production history of each district. When new firms set up in a locale, they exacerbate competition on the corresponding labor market, thus leading to a wage rise that reduces the incentives for firms to locate in the most efficient district. The short-run equilibrium distribution of firms are studied as well as the long-run properties of the adjustment process.

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Cooperation vs. competition in a spatial model

Cited by 57 publications

References 18 publications

High-tech clusters, technology spillovers, and trade secret laws

High-tech clusters, technology spillovers, and trade secret laws

Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms

Learning-by-Doing and the Development of Industrial Districts

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