Cooperative advertising and pricing in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain with a general demand function; A game-theoretic approach

Chaab, Jafar; Rasti−Barzoki, Morteza

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2016.07.007

Cited by 75 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Aust and Buscher [17] expanded the existing research which deals with advertising and pricing decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain contemporaneously on the basis of previous studies. Chaab and Rasti-Barzoki [18] mainly analyzed how the advertising factors of the manufacturer and retailer affected the optimal decision results and profits. Advertising strategy is considered in the CLSC.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing, Carbon Emission Reduction, Low-Carbon Promotion and Returning Decision in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Vertical and Horizontal Cooperation

Wang

Shang

et al. 2017

IJERPH

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In this paper, we examine the influences of vertical and horizontal cooperation models on the optimal decisions and performance of a low-carbon closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a manufacturer and two retailers, and study optimal operation in the competitive pricing, competitive the low-carbon promotion, the carbon emission reduction, the used-products collection and the profits. We consider the completely decentralized model, M-R vertical cooperation model, R-R horizontal cooperation model, M-R-R vertical and horizontal cooperation model and completely centralized model, and also identify the optimal decision results and profits. It can be observed from a systematic comparison and numerical analysis that the completely centralized model is best in all optimal decision results among all models. In semi-cooperation, the M-R vertical cooperation model is positive, the R-R horizontal cooperation model is passive, and the positivity of the M-R-R vertical and horizontal cooperation model decreases with competitive intensity increasing in the used-products returning, carbon emissions reduction level, low-carbon promotion effort and the profits of the manufacturer and the entire supply chain.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing, Carbon Emission Reduction, Low-Carbon Promotion and Returning Decision in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Vertical and Horizontal Cooperation

Wang

Shang

et al. 2017

IJERPH

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“…Achieving channel coordination under co-op advertising games is a significant issue which leads to the improvement of SC performance (Dant & Berger, 1996;Yue et al, 2006;Chaab & Rasti-Barzoki, 2016). Whereas, under individually decision-making, the "double marginalization" phenomenon is occurred due to lack of coordination (Aust & Buscher, 2012;SeyedEsfahani, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A primary co-op advertising model was developed by Berger (1973). Chintagunta and Jain (1992), Li et al (2002), Karray and Zaccour (2005), Xie andNeyret (2009), SeyedEsfahani (2011), Zhang et al (2013), Liu et al (2014), Chaab and Rasti-Barzoki (2016) investigated cooperative advertising models from various perspectives such as static, dynamic, good will, reference price and so forth. For more detailed information, the interested readers are referred to Jørgensen and Zaccour (2014) who comprehensively reviewed cooperative advertising models.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of cooperative promotion efforts with competing retailers in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain

Johari¹,

Hosseini‐Motlagh²

2018

10.5267/j.uscm

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In this paper, the issue of cooperative (co-op) promotion efforts is addressed in a two-stage supply chain (SC). The investigated SC includes one monopolistic manufacturer and two duopolistic retailers facing different market demands. The customers' demand is affected by both advertising efforts of the manufacturer and two retailers. Moreover, the retailers compete with each other on local advertising investments within the market. In order to boost the retailers' advertising level, it is assumed that the manufacturer pays a ratio of the retailers' advertising expenditures. We propose four non-cooperative game scenarios and one cooperative game. Non-cooperative models are established through both Stackelberg and Nash game between two echelons. Moreover, both Cournot and Collusion behaviors are assumed to be followed by two retailers. We develop a promotion cost sharing contract to achieve the channel coordination. Under cooperation model, all SC members seek to reach the highest profit for the entire SC by considering the bargaining power of the SC participants. In each game scenario the optimal solution and unique equilibrium are determined. In addition, a comparison on the advertising level of all SC members along with the value of participation rate are provided. In addition, the feasibility of the cooperative game is discussed and resulted.

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“…Different cooperative advertising models have been studied more sufficiently in the forward supply chain (FSC) [22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32] including two excellent reviews [22,23]. On the other hand, advertising occupies a crucial position in promoting the quantity of collected used products [33].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Meanwhile, considering retailers' increasing power in supply chains, another two games, Stackelberg-retailer and equal power as in Nash game, were taken into account [26,27,29,31]. As for the issue of UMs collection, the deficiency or ambiguity of related laws and regulations in most countries and regions results in the uncertainty surrounding who should take the responsibility to collect UMs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theoretic Analysis of Pricing and Cooperative Advertising in a Reverse Supply Chain for Unwanted Medications in Households

2017

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Improper disposal of household unwanted medications (UMs) is an emergency problem around the world that adversely affects the sustainability of the environment and human's health. However, the current disposal practices, mainly based on advertising and collecting status, are unsatisfactory in most countries and regions. Thus, some scholars proposed an alternative disposal practice that is to provide incentives to customers. This study aims to compare a Single Model (advertising only) with a Joint Model (advertising with take-back pricing) in a two-echelon reverse supply chain (RSC) that is composed of one disposer and one collector. In each model, four games (non-cooperative, collector as the Stackelberg leader, disposer as the Stackelberg leader, and cooperative) were established in order to identify the optimal pricing and advertising strategies for both members. The results of the study indicate that there is a Pareto dominant range for Joint Model compared to Single Model, whereas Single Model has no Pareto improvement in any games. Furthermore, in non-cooperative games of Joint Model, it is better to implement the leader-follower structure rather than simultaneous movement structure. Additionally, it is verified that the cooperative game is feasible, which leads to the cooperation between the disposer and the collector, and the extra profit from the cooperation can be shared based on the Nash bargaining game. However, in Single Model, it is better for the disposer to act as a channel leader and the collector figures the follower.

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Cooperative advertising and pricing in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain with a general demand function; A game-theoretic approach

Cited by 75 publications

References 45 publications

Pricing, Carbon Emission Reduction, Low-Carbon Promotion and Returning Decision in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Vertical and Horizontal Cooperation

Pricing, Carbon Emission Reduction, Low-Carbon Promotion and Returning Decision in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Vertical and Horizontal Cooperation

Coordination of cooperative promotion efforts with competing retailers in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain

Game Theoretic Analysis of Pricing and Cooperative Advertising in a Reverse Supply Chain for Unwanted Medications in Households

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