Cooperative Advertising and Pricing in a Dynamic Stochastic Supply Chain: Feedback Stackelberg Strategies

He, Xiuli; Prasad, Ashutosh; Sethi, Suresh P.

doi:10.1111/j.1937-5956.2009.01006.x

Cited by 218 publications

(162 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…These findings are similar to He et al [41] and Zhang et al [44]. These findings are similar to He et al [41] and Zhang et al [44].…”

Section: Decentralized Scenario ("D")supporting

confidence: 91%

“…These observations are in line with He et al [41] and Sigué and Chintagunta [43]. Maintaining the constant price and effort decisions is easy to implement from a managerial perspective.…”

Section: Centralized Scenario ("C")supporting

confidence: 87%

“…In other words, the dynamic characteristic of the problem does not affect this value, and central management can decide the retail price before determining the effort strategies [24,41]. Meanwhile, the retail price is constant and independent of effort decisions.…”

Section: Centralized Scenario ("C")mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategic transfer pricing in a marketing–operations interface with quality level and advertising dependent goodwill

Liu

Zhang

Tang

2015

Omega

104

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“…These findings are similar to He et al [41] and Zhang et al [44]. These findings are similar to He et al [41] and Zhang et al [44].…”

Section: Decentralized Scenario ("D")supporting

confidence: 91%

“…These observations are in line with He et al [41] and Sigué and Chintagunta [43]. Maintaining the constant price and effort decisions is easy to implement from a managerial perspective.…”

Section: Centralized Scenario ("C")supporting

confidence: 87%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Strategic transfer pricing in a marketing–operations interface with quality level and advertising dependent goodwill

Liu

Zhang

Tang

2015

Omega

104

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“…He et al . studied the problem of cooperative advertising in the supply chain . Given the impact of demand on price and advertising in a two‐echelon supply chain, Xieab developed the retailer's optimal ordering strategy and supplier's buy‐back strategy .…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative decision in a closed‐loop supply chain considering carbon emission reduction and low‐carbon promotion

Wang

Shang

et al. 2018

Env Prog and Sustain Energy

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This study examines manufacturers' carbon emission reduction level and retailers' low‐carbon promotion effort in a low‐carbon closed‐loop supply chain (CLSC), in which a manufacturer directly collects the used‐products from consumers. Considering both the carbon emission reduction level and low‐carbon promotion effort depending on the market demands, this study investigates the optimal decisions and performances of CLSC under four different game structures, that is, one non‐cooperative structure and three cooperative structures. In the non‐cooperative structure, the manufacturer controls the carbon emission level, the collection level as well as the wholesale price, while the retailer controls the low‐carbon promotion effort and retail price. The cooperative structures consist of one‐way and two‐way cooperation. In one‐way cooperative structure, the manufacturer shares only a part of retailer's low‐carbon promotion cost. In two‐way cooperative structure, the retailer shares partial manufacturer's carbon emission reduction cost or collection cost based on the one‐way cooperative structure. It shows that the two‐way cooperative structure of the co‐op promotion and carbon emission reduction is the optimal in pricing decisions and carbon emission reduction level, as well as two‐way cooperative structure of the co‐op promotion and collection is the optimal in the collection effort. Under lower the consumer's low‐carbon preferences, the retailer agrees to share the manufacturer's collection cost. When the consumer's low‐carbon preferences are higher, the retailer agrees to share the manufacturer's carbon emission reduction cost. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Environ Prog, 38: 143–153, 2019

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“…For the manufacturer, it is important to correctly determine what the subsidy rate should be and whether a cooperative advertising program should be offered at all. While some previous research has examined this issue in a bilateral monopoly setting (e.g., He, Prasad, & Sethi, 2009), the situation is more complicated if the retailer is in a competitive market. Nevertheless, duopolistic or oligopolistic competition is quite common in many industries and this element will be examined in this article.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Co‐Op Advertising in Dynamic Retail Oligopolies

He¹,

Krishnamoorthy²,

Prasad³

et al. 2012

Decision Sciences

Self Cite

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We study a supply chain in which a consumer goods manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. The retailer undertakes promotional expenditures, such as advertising, to increase sales and to compete against other retailer(s). The manufacturer supports the retailer's promotional expenditure through a cooperative advertising program by reimbursing a portion (called the subsidy rate) of the retailer's promotional expenditure.To determine the subsidy rate, we formulate a Stackelberg differential game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and a Nash differential subgame between the retailer and the competing retailer(s). We derive the optimal feedback promotional expenditures of the retailers and the optimal feedback subsidy rate of the manufacturer, and show how they are influenced by market parameters. An important finding is that the manufacturer should support its retailer only when a subsidy threshold is crossed. The impact of competition on this threshold is nonmonotone. Specifically, the manufacturer offers more support when its retailer competes with one other retailer but its support starts decreasing with the presence of additional retailers. In the case where the manufacturer sells through all retailers, we show under certain assumptions that it should support only one dominant retailer. We also describe how we can incorporate retail price competition into the model.

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Cooperative Advertising and Pricing in a Dynamic Stochastic Supply Chain: Feedback Stackelberg Strategies

Cited by 218 publications

References 43 publications

Strategic transfer pricing in a marketing–operations interface with quality level and advertising dependent goodwill

Strategic transfer pricing in a marketing–operations interface with quality level and advertising dependent goodwill

Cooperative decision in a closed‐loop supply chain considering carbon emission reduction and low‐carbon promotion

Co‐Op Advertising in Dynamic Retail Oligopolies

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