Cooperative and non-cooperative harvesting in a stochastic sequential fishery

Laukkanen, Marita

doi:10.1016/s0095-0696(02)00020-7

Cited by 43 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Australia and Papua New Guinea have 20+ years of cooperation in managing the Torres Strait rock lobster fishery and there are mutual benefits for continuous cooperation. Munro (1979) and Laukkanen (2003) have provided solid analyses based on game theory and concluded that cooperative harvesting yields participants substantial gains in terms of expected pay-offs. This study provides further quantitative evidence that Australia and Papua New Guinea should use cooperative harvest strategies for the benefit of both countries and for the long-term sustainability of the Torres Strait rock lobster fishery.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the impacts of trawling breeding lobsters(Panulirus ornatus)on the catch of the Torres Strait lobster fishery shared between Australia and Papua New Guinea

Dennis

2009

New Zealand Journal of Marine and Freshwater Research

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The shared Torres Strait rock lobster (Panulirus ornatus) fishery provides important income for commercial and traditional fishers in Australia and Papua New Guinea. The lobster stock is first fished in Torres Strait by divers from both countries and then becomes vulnerable to Australian prawn trawlers, followed by Papua New Guinea trawlers during its annual breeding migration. Lobster catch sharing arrangements are governed by the Torres Strait Treaty ratified in 1985, but the sequential trawling of breeding lobsters has been controlled by bilateral agreements. A trawl ban was implemented in 1984 in both countries to conserve the breeding stock, but some trawling has been conducted in the Gulf of Papua since then and there is renewed interest in Papua New Guinea to resume trawling. To evaluate the impact of trawling migratory breeding lobsters on the lobster fishery, a model that combines a cohort depletion model with a stock recruitment relationship was developed in this study. The model showed that when the fishery is fully or over-exploited by the dive fishery, trawling breeding lobsters would reduce both the spawning stock and the total catch of the fishery. The reduction in catch would increase with increasing fishing mortality. If trawling occurred on the Papua New Guinea side only, a redistribution of catch between Australia and Papua New Guinea would result in a small gain in catch for Papua New Guinea at the expense of the Australian dive fishery. But when fishing mortality reaches a certain level, any trawling in any country will incur catch loss to both countries. For the long-term sustainability and maximum production of the fishery, regulations should be implemented in both countries under a comanagement scheme of a shared fish stock.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the impacts of trawling breeding lobsters(Panulirus ornatus)on the catch of the Torres Strait lobster fishery shared between Australia and Papua New Guinea

Dennis

2009

New Zealand Journal of Marine and Freshwater Research

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“…Since then, a host of researchers have refined these insights. There have been attempts to model common-pool resources as dynamic games, with various assumptions about discounting, and payoffs either independent of resource stock (Benhabib and Radner, 1992;Cave, 1987;Dutta, 1995) or dependent on stock (Hannesson, 1997;Laukkanen, 2003;Tarui et al, 2008). These models have also introduced a range of assumptions about monitoring, from perfect monitoring and individual sanction (Casari and Plott, 2003;Ostrom, 1990) to imperfect monitoring and unobservable individual actions (Cason and Khan, 1999;Chermak and Krause, 2002;Isaac and Walker, 1988).…”

Section: The Tragedy Of the Commonsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling the commons as a game with vector payoffs

Lejano¹,

Ingram²

2011

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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Since Hardin first formulated the tragedy of the commons, researchers have described various ways that commons problems are solved, all based on the model of individual rationality. Invariably, these institutional solutions involve creating some system of property rights. We formulate an alternative model, one not founded on property rights but on decision-making around so-called vector payoffs. The model is formalized and an existence proof provided. The new model is shown to be effective in explaining some anomalous results (e.g., unanticipated cooperation) in the experimental games literature that run counter to the rational model. We then use the case of the buffalo commons to illustrate how the new model affords alternative explanations for examples like the rise and fall of the buffalo herds in the Great Plains. We find the vector payoff model to complement, though not displace, that of individual rationality.

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“…Laukkanen (2003) considers stochastic stock recruitment in a transboundary fishery where two fleets operate sequentially, and describes a self-enforcing agreement that can support cooperative harvesting. Another important source of variation is the ability of management in each country participating in negotiations to achieve management targets in any one year.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We compare the implications of implementation uncertainty and recruitment uncertainty for cooperative harvesting. Differing from the sequential fishery model in Laukkanen (2003), we consider a shared fishery where the competing countries harvest simultaneously. Growth and reproduction depend on how much each fleet leaves behind after harvesting.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transboundary Fisheries Management Under Implementation Uncertainty

Laukkanen

2003

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Terms of use: Documents in Transboundary Fisheries Management under Implementation Uncertainty SummaryThis paper examines how non-binding co-operative agreements on marine fisheries management can be sustained when management plans in participating countries are implemented with error. The effects of implementation uncertainty on voluntary cooperation are compared to those of recruitment uncertainty. A self-enforcing cooperative solution can only be sustained when uncertainty is not too pronounced. Even when a co-operative agreement can be achieved, frequent phases of reversion to non-cooperative harvest levels are needed to support the agreement. The implications of recruitment uncertainty for implicit co-operation are less detrimental than those of implementation uncertainty.

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Cooperative and non-cooperative harvesting in a stochastic sequential fishery

Cited by 43 publications

References 19 publications

Assessing the impacts of trawling breeding lobsters(Panulirus ornatus)on the catch of the Torres Strait lobster fishery shared between Australia and Papua New Guinea

Assessing the impacts of trawling breeding lobsters(Panulirus ornatus)on the catch of the Torres Strait lobster fishery shared between Australia and Papua New Guinea

Modeling the commons as a game with vector payoffs

Transboundary Fisheries Management Under Implementation Uncertainty

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