Cooperative game approaches to coordinating a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns

Xiaoxian, Zheng; Zhi, Liu; Li, Kevin; Huang, Jun; Ji, Chen

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.01.011

Cited by 208 publications

(127 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…ey further devised a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate a twoechelon CLSC with both members' fairness concerns. Nevertheless, Zheng et al [4] proposed a cooperative game approach to coordinate a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain with fairness concern. For overconfidence, based on the principal-agent theory, Wang et al [23] designed an optional contract to achieve a two-echelon supply chain with overconfidence coordination and Pareto improvement.…”

Section: Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the parameters related to overconfidence, Ren et al [1] set β ∈ [0, 1] and c � 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9 { } to perform their numerical experiments, and Li et al [7] set β ∈ (0, 1) and c � 5 to conduct their study. For the parameters related to fairness concern, Zheng et al [4] set μ ≥ 0, c � 20, and a � 100 to implement their numerical analysis, and Guo et al [9] set μ ≥ 0 to perform their studies. According to the parameters above, Complexity we assumed β ∈ [0, 1) and μ � 0, 1, 2 { } to reflect the level of overconfidence and fairness concern in this paper.…”

Section: Numerical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…ese two behavior preferences were observed anecdotally in practice. For example, Eastman Kodak Company overestimated its technical ability and ignored the planning for the future, which led to declined sales and eventually bankruptcy [3]; Gome in March 2016 was concerned about distributional fairness and wanted to capitalize on its dominating power in the retailing industry to extract more profit from the manufacturer [4]. Overconfidence is the most widespread cognitive bias in the decision-making process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

et al. 2020

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The purpose of this study was to examine the joint effect of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain decisions and design contracts to achieve a win-win situation within the supply chain. For this study, a centralized supply chain model was established without considering the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concern. Furthermore, the retailers’ overconfidence and fairness concerns were introduced into the decentralized supply chain, while the Stackelberg game model between the manufacturer and the retailer was built. Furthermore, an innovative supply chain contract, i.e., buyback contract, with promotional cost sharing was designed to achieve supply chain coordination along with overconfidence and fairness concern. Finally, a numerical analysis was also conducted to analyze the effect of overconfidence, fairness concern, and the validity of the contract. The principal findings of the study include the positive correlation between retailers’ overconfidence and optimal order quantity, sales effort, expected utility, and profit. Although the order quantity and sales efforts were not affected by the fairness concern of the retailer, the contract achieved coordination with a win-win outcome when the level of overconfidence and fairness concern was moderate.

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Section: Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Numerical Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

et al. 2020

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“…In the CLSC, used products can be recycled by various subjects. For example, the used products can be recycled by the manufacturer [4] or by the retailer [5]. Wei and Zhao [6] studied the decision-making issue of the used products recycled by the manufacturer, the retailer, or the third party recovery provider (3PRP).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mitigation of Bullwhip Effect in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Fuzzy Robust Control Approach

Zhang

2020

Complexity

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Uncertainties and lead times make the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) more complex, less stable, and then the bullwhip effect (BE) will become more intense. This paper will address a fuzzy robust control (FRC) approach to mitigate the BE in the uncertain CLSC with lead times. For the reverse channels for products in the CLSC, the customers’ used products are recycled by both the manufacturer and the third party recovery provider, and new products bought by customers within a certain period of time can be returned to the retailer. In the CLSC system, the state transformation equations of the inventories and the total operation cost are set up. A new FRC approach is proposed to mitigate the BE and realize the robust stability of the uncertain CLSC with lead times. A simulation example verifies the mitigation effect of the BE under the proposed FRC approach.

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“…Liu et al investigates product design issue and its impact on the operations of a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer, and consumers [34]. Zheng et al analyses cooperative and noncooperative game theoretically in a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain; the retailer's fairness concern is also considered in this game model [35]. However, the above studies did not consider the cost constraint into manufacturer's decision and discussed two products with completely different environmental qualities and traditional qualities.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Optimal Green Product Design with Cost Constraint and Sustainable Policies for the Manufacturer

Zhang

Zhou

2019

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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In this paper, we study how the manufacturer balances the investment between the green product and the ordinary product as consumer environmental awareness (CEA) increases. e green product and ordinary product have a basic commonality traditional quality but difference between the premium environmental quality and premium traditional quality. With the cost constraint, we present manufacturer's optimal strategy: producing one product or two products and the optimal traditional quality of the ordinary product or the optimal environmental quality of the green product. en, we further study the effect of government subsidy and tax on manufacturer's strategies and analyze the effectiveness of the policies. Finally, we give some numerical examples and sensitivity analysis. e main findings are as follows: (1) manufacturer's cost constraint affects product's optimal quality but may not influence manufacturer's optimal product strategy: the manufacturer may not produce two products even through the budget is sufficient large; (2) the government policy could induce the manufacturer to invest green product but may be inefficient; the subsidy and tax policies are mutual exclusion; and either subsidy or tax could play a role in changing manufacturer's strategy. Some management insights are given.

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Cooperative game approaches to coordinating a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns

Cited by 208 publications

References 55 publications

Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

Supply Chain Decisions and Coordination under the Combined Effect of Overconfidence and Fairness Concern

Mitigation of Bullwhip Effect in Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Fuzzy Robust Control Approach

The Optimal Green Product Design with Cost Constraint and Sustainable Policies for the Manufacturer

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