Cooperative game theoretic centrality analysis of terrorist networks: The cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda

Lindelauf, Roy; Hamers, Herbert; Husslage, B.G.M.

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2013.02.032

Cited by 84 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…This solution works only for unweighted graphs. Lindelauf et al [2013] expanded this concept to weighted graphs by using an arbitrary function if coalition is connected. The authors proposed several definitions of function f , but only for specific terrorist networks.…”

Section: Node-weighted Graphsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At a first glance, it may seem that we should simply look for nodes with the highest degree, i.e., the number of incident edges. However, a need for more advanced measures of connectivity has been advocated in a number of different areas, spanning from evaluation of the importance of genes in gene interaction networks [Moretti et al, 2010] and assessing the impact of failure in monetary flows networks [Belau, 2014] to social network analysis [Narayanam et al, 2014] and the analysis of covert networks [Lindelauf et al, 2013].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In these networks, weights of nodes and edges may carry additional intelligence available about criminals or terrorists and the links between them. For instance, weights of edges are used to represent frequency of interaction [Koschade, 2006] while weights of nodes to represent individual evaluations of terrorists, based on known skills and prior activities [Lindelauf et al, 2013].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Attachment Centrality for Weighted Graphs

Sosnowska

Skibski

2017

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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Measuring how central nodes are in terms of connecting a network has recently received increasing attention in the literature. While a few dedicated centrality measures have been proposed, Skibski et al. [2016] showed that the Attachment Centrality is the only one that satisfies certain natural axioms desirable for connectivity. Unfortunately, the Attachment Centrality is defined only for unweighted graphs which makes this measure ill-fitted for various applications. For instance, covert networks are typically weighted, where the weights carry additional intelligence available about criminals or terrorists and the links between them. To analyse such settings, in this paper we extend the Attachment Centrality to node-weighted and edgeweighted graphs. By an axiomatic analysis, we show that the Attachment Centrality is closely related to the Degree Centrality in weighted graphs.

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Section: Node-weighted Graphsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Attachment Centrality for Weighted Graphs

Sosnowska

Skibski

2017

Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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“…For instance in Lindelauf et al (2013) the operational WTC 9/11 network is analyzed, consisting of the 19 hijackers of the four planes involved in the attack. Using a cooperative game that takes both compositional and structural variables into account a ranking is obtained using the Shapley value.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In genetics Moretti et al (2007) use the Shapley value of the microarray game to determine the most important genes for specific body functions. Lindelauf et al (2013) model terrorist networks by connectivity games and use the Shapley value to identify key players in such networks. More applications of the Shapley value in different fields can be found in the survey of Moretti and Patrone (2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A new approximation method for the Shapley value applied to the WTC 9/11 terrorist attack

Campen

Hamers

Husslage

et al. 2017

Soc. Netw. Anal. Min.

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The Shapley value (Shapley in Ann Math Stud 2: 28, 1953) is one of the most prominent one-point solution concepts in cooperative game theory that divides revenues (or cost, power) that can be obtained by cooperation of players in the game. The Shapley value is mathematically characterized by properties that have appealing real-world interpretations and hence its use in practical settings is easily justified. The down part is that its computational complexity increases exponentially with the number of players in the game. Therefore, in practical problems that consist of more than 25 players the calculation of the Shapley value is usually too time expensive. Among others the Shapley value is applied in the analysis of terrorist networks

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Conclusions and Future Research

Muros

2019

Cooperative Game Theory Tools in Coalitional Control Networks

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Cooperative game theoretic centrality analysis of terrorist networks: The cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda

Cited by 84 publications

References 13 publications

Attachment Centrality for Weighted Graphs

Attachment Centrality for Weighted Graphs

A new approximation method for the Shapley value applied to the WTC 9/11 terrorist attack

Conclusions and Future Research

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